H  D 

.b        IE    FREEMAN    PAMPHLETS 

Qs    


"WHERE  IRON  IS,  THERE  IS 

THE  FATHERLAND!" 

h 

Clarence  K.  Streit 


uc-nrlf 


$B    212    02A 


B.  W.  HUEBSCH,  Inc. 

Publisher 

NEW  YORK 


that  sector.  Just  a  few  miles  behind  them  they  knew  the 
French  .iron  mines! and  smelters  were  working  at  top  speed 
for  t\\6  productibn  of  raw'  material  for  war  munitions.  And 
they  could  Jcok' !©ver  •  the  German  lines  into  that  part  of 
France  held  by  the  enemy  and  into  Lorraine  and  see  the 
iron  mines  and  smelters  there  at  work  for  the  production  of 
shells  that  they  suspected  were  destined  for  them.  And  on 
the  front  which  separated  the  producers  of  munitions  for 
friend  and  foe  reigned  quiet. 

The  vital  relation  of  iron,  the  basis  of  war  munitions,  to 
success  in  a  modern  war  is  so  generally  known  that  a  glance 
at  a  mineral  map  and  at  statistics  of  France  and  Germany 
will  immediately  demonstrate  to  any  one  the  supreme  stra- 
tegical importance  of  this  quiet  sector.  The  principal  iron 
mines  and  smelters  of  both  powers  were  situated  close  to  that 
front.  From  the  province  of  Lorraine,  then  a  part  of  Ger- 
many, in  1 91 3  came  29,000,000  of  the  36,000,000  tons  of 
iron  ore  produced  in  that  country  —  80  per  cent,  of  her  entire 
production.  From  the  department  of  Meurthe-et-Moselle, 
separated  from  Lorraine  only  by  the  boundary  of  1871,  came 
I9>8i3,572  of  the  21,500,000  tons  of  iron  ore  produced  in 
France  in  191 3,  or  92  per  cent,  of  her  entire  production. 

Now,  the  German  Lorraine  iron  district  extended  across 
the  political  frontier,  forming  in  France  what  is  known  as 
the  Basin  of  Briey.  From  this  small  basin,  which  is  in  the 
department  of  Meurthe-et-Moselle,  came  75  per  cent,  of  the 
iron  ore  mined  in  that  department,  and  70  per  cent,  of  all 
the  iron  ore  produced  in  France. 

The  Germans,  after  they  had  won  the  war  of  1870  which 
was  really  fought  for  the  control  of  the  valuable  Lorraine 
iron  basin,  annexed  Lorraine,  but  they  left  Briey  to  France 
for,  though  the  Lorraine  vein  extended  under  the  boundary 
into  Briey,  this  ore  field  was  then  thought  to  be  worthless. 
But  a  few  years  later  it  was  found  that  by  use  of  the  Thomas 
process  the  iron  ore  in  the  French  part  of  the  basin  could  be 
treated  and  was  really  superior  in  quality  to  the  deposits  ex- 
isting in  annexed  Lorraine.    That  led  to  the  rapid  develop- 

2 


ment  of  the  iron  mining  and  smelting  industry  in  the  Basin 
of  Briey. 

When  the  war  broke  out  in  19 14,  the  Germans  imme- 
diately invaded  this  Briey  basin,  and,  encountering  no  re- 
sistance, seized  possession  of  it.  They  remained  in  control 
of  it  to  the  end  of  the  war.  It  was  not  until  the  Americans 
launched  an  offensive  in  the  direction  of  Briey  late  in  19 18 
that  the  Allies  threatened  the  German  possession  of  the 
basin  which  produced  before  the  war  70  per  cent,  of  the 
iron  ore  of  France.  Previous  to  that  time  the  Germans  for 
at  least  twenty-seven  months  of  the  war  had  exploited  with 
remarkable  immunity  not  only  their  own  iron  district  of 
Lorraine  but  also  the  French  Basin  of  Briey,  which  was 
even  closer  to  the  front,  being  not  twenty-five  miles  distant 
from  the  trenches.  For  this  was  the  quiet  sector  of  the  front. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  immense  importance  to 
the  Germans  of  the  possession  of  Briey.  Before  the  war, 
Germany  imported  14,000,000  tons  of  iron  ore  each  year. 
Before  1913,  France  stood  third  in  furnishing  this  mineral 
to  Germany.  That  year  France  passed  Spain  and  stood 
second,  exporting  to  Germany  3,811,000  tons  from  the  Briey 
basin,  only  700,000  tons  less  than  the  amount  which  Ger- 
many imported  from  Sweden  that  year. 

The  war  enormously  increased  Germany's  need  for  iron 
ore  as  she  had  to  produce  munitions,  not  only  for  her  own 
armies  but  also  for  her  allies.  And  then  the  British  blockade 
cut  off  her  usual  supply  from  Spain.  Francis  Laur,  author 
of  the  book,  "  La  France,  Reine  de  Fer "  (France,  the 
Queen  of  Iron),  in  a  letter  to  a  daily  newspaper  of  Paris, 
L'GLuvre,  published  May  9,  19 16,  cited  official  figures  pub- 
lished by  the  Union  of  German  Iron  Industries  which 
showed  that  the  production  of  cast  iron  in  Germany  dropped 
from  1,561,944  tons  in  July,  19 14,  to  587,661  tons  in  Aug- 
ust of  that  year.  But  in  October,  19 14,  the  production  be- 
gan to  increase  steadily,  until  in  August,  19 15,  it  had  reached 
the  total  of  1,050,610  tons  —  only  500,000  tons  less  than  it 
had  been  before  the  war  when  Germany  had  had  to  import 

3 


u 


Where  Iron  is,  there 
is  the  father  land  I ' ' 


a 


Where  Iron  is,  there 
is  the  fatherland! 

A  NOTE  ON  THE  RELA- 
TION OF  PRIVILEGE 
AND  MONOPOLY  TO  WAR 

By  Clarence  K.j  Streit 

i  /t 


ft 


New  York  B.  W.  HUEBSCH,  Inc.,  Mcmxx 


COPYRIGHT,   1920,  BY  B.   W.   HUEBSCH,  Inc. 


•  *••••••*•*      ••••••      •    •' 


j*<- 


CONTENTS 

the  basin  of  briey,  i 

"where  iron  is,  there  is  the  fatherland!'*  8 

interlocking  directorates,  1 3 

monopoly,  14 

gold  and  iron,  1 5 

LEAD,    l6 

NICKEL   NOT   CONTRABAND,    1 6 

SUBLIME   INNOCENCE,    1 7 

THE   FRENCH   TRUST  FAVORS   KRUPPS,    1 8 

BUSINESS   IS    BUSINESS,    20 

ACROSS  THE   BLOCKADE,   22 

HOW    FRENCH    METAL   SUPPLIES   WERE   CONTROLLED,   23 

PATRIOTEERS,    25 

THE    BRIEY    INVESTIGATION,    26 

ENTER  THE   CENSOR,    28 

STRANGE    BEDFELLOWS,    30 

ECONOMIC    MALTHUSIANISM    OR — ?  32 

WHEN  IS  A  FORT  NOT  A  FORT?   33 

SANS   PEUR   ET   SANS   REPROCHE,    35 

THE   AGREEMENT   FOR  A   LORRAINE   OFFENSIVE,   36 

BRIEY   IMMUNE,    39 

GERMANY  RECIPROCATES,   4 1 

THE    COURTEOUS    GERMANS,   44 


576367 


11  a  gentlemen's  agreement?  "  45 
the  flag  of  big  business,  46 
pity  the  poor  steel  trust,  49 
bloody  profits,  50 
stock  and  bond  morality,  5 1 


"  It  is  only  for  the  poor  devils  that 
war  is  not  a  gentleman's  agreement." 
— Pierre  Renaudel,  French  Dep- 
uty. 

"  I  formally  accuse  the  big  cosmo- 
politan banks,  at  least  the  owners  of 
mining  rights,  of  having  conceived, 
prepared  and  let  loose  this  horrible 
tragedy  with  the  monstrous  thought 
of  world  stock-jobbing.  I  accuse  these 
same  money  powers  of  having,  before 
and  since  the  war,  betrayed  the  inter- 
ests of  France." —  Senator  Gaudin 
de  Villaine  (Conservative). 


"  WHERE  IRON  IS,  THERE  IS  THE 
FATHERLAND!" 

THE    BASIN    OF    BRIEY 

WHEN  American  troops  first  went  into  the  front  line 
trenches  in  France  they  were  given  the  quietest 
sectors  on  the  western  front. 

"  Not  a  man  had  been  killed  in  that  part  of  the  front 
since  the  war  began,  the  French  troops  whom  we  relieved 
told   us." 

"  At  one  place  along  that  front  there  was  a  little  wine- 
shop out  in  No  Man's  Land.  We  used  to  patronize  it  dur- 
ing the  day  while  the  Boches  would  get  their  liquor  there 
at  night." 

These  are  typical  of  statements  made  by  Yank  officers 
and  men  who  got  their  trench  training  in  that  sector. 

As  every  one  knows,  this  area  whose  quiet  conditions  made 
it  suitable  for  the  training  of  new  troops  to  trench  life  was 
along  the  Lorraine  front.  Few  people  in  the  United 
States,  it  seems,  have  been  curious  enough  to  ask  why  this 
particular  part  of  the  western  front  should  have  been  so 
quiet.  But  not  so  in  France  where  the  importance  of  this 
region  is  much  more  widely  known  than  it  is  in  this  country. 
A  few  months  after  the  war  began  the  tranquillity  of  the 
Lorraine  front  aroused  discussion  in  the  press  whose  warmth, 
dampened  considerably  by  a  vigilant  censor,  has  since  the 
war  brought  about  a  long  debate  in  the  French  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  followed  by  an  official  investigation  by  a  com- 
mittee of  the  parliament. 

It  must  be  said  also  that  the  quietness  of  the  Lorraine 
front  puzzled  some  of  the  American  soldiers  who  were  in 

I 


that  sector.  Just  a  few  miles  behind  them  they  knew  the 
French  iron  mfrie&|an;d  .smelters  were  working  at  top  speed 
for  the"  produc'tidn  of  raw'  material  for  war  munitions.  And 
they  cpTild  Jcok' !©ver « th'e  German  lines  into  that  part  of 
France  held'  by  the '  enemy  and  into  Lorraine  and  see  the 
iron  mines  and  smelters  there  at  work  for  the  production  of 
shells  that  they  suspected  were  destined  for  them.  And  on 
the  front  which  separated  the  producers  of  munitions  for 
friend  and  foe  reigned  quiet. 

The  vital  relation  of  iron,  the  basis  of  war  munitions,  to 
success  in  a  modern  war  is  so  generally  known  that  a  glance 
at  a  mineral  map  and  at  statistics  of  France  and  Germany 
will  immediately  demonstrate  to  any  one  the  supreme  stra- 
tegical importance  of  this  quiet  sector.  The  principal  iron 
mines  and  smelters  of  both  powers  were  situated  close  to  that 
front.  From  the  province  of  Lorraine,  then  a  part  of  Ger- 
many, in  1913  came  29,000,000  of  the  36,000,000  tons  of 
iron  ore  produced  in  that  country  —  80  per  cent,  of  her  entire 
production.  From  the  department  of  Meurthe-et-Moselle, 
separated  from  Lorraine  only  by  the  boundary  of  1871,  came 
I9)8i3,572  of  the  21,500,000  tons  of  iron  ore  produced  in 
France  in  191 3,  or  92  per  cent,  of  her  entire  production. 

Now,  the  German  Lorraine  iron  district  extended  across 
the  political  frontier,  forming  in  France  what  is  known  as 
the  Basin  of  Briey.  From  this  small  basin,  which  is  in  the 
department  of  Meurthe-et-Moselle,  came  75  per  cent,  of  the 
iron  ore  mined  in  that  department,  and  70  per  cent,  of  all 
the  iron  ore  produced  in  France. 

The  Germans,  after  they  had  won  the  war  of  1870  which 
was  really  fought  for  the  control  of  the  valuable  Lorraine 
iron  basin,  annexed  Lorraine,  but  they  left  Briey  to  France 
for,  though  the  Lorraine  vein  extended  under  the  boundary 
into  Briey,  this  ore  field  was  then  thought  to  be  worthless. 
But  a  few  years  later  it  was  found  that  by  use  of  the  Thomas 
process  the  iron  ore  in  the  French  part  of  the  basin  could  be 
treated  and  was  really  superior  in  quality  to  the  deposits  ex- 
isting in  annexed  Lorraine.    That  led  to  the  rapid  develop- 

2 


ment  of  the  iron  mining  and  smelting  industry  in  the  Basin 
of  Briey. 

When  the  war  broke  out  in  19 14,  the  Germans  imme- 
diately invaded  this  Briey  basin,  and,  encountering  no  re- 
sistance, seized  possession  of  it.  They  remained  in  control 
of  it  to  the  end  of  the  war.  It  was  not  until  the  Americans 
launched  an  offensive  in  the  direction  of  Briey  late  in  19 18 
that  the  Allies  threatened  the  German  possession  of  the 
basin  which  produced  before  the  war  70  per  cent,  of  the 
iron  ore  of  France.  Previous  to  that  time  the  Germans  for 
at  least  twenty-seven  months  of  the  war  had  exploited  with 
remarkable  immunity  not  only  their  own  iron  district  of 
Lorraine  but  also  the  French  Basin  of  Briey,  which  was 
even  closer  to  the  front,  being  not  twenty-five  miles  distant 
from  the  trenches.  For  this  was  the  quiet  sector  of  the  front. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  immense  importance  to 
the  Germans  of  the  possession  of  Briey.  Before  the  war, 
Germany  imported  14,000,000  tons  of  iron  ore  each  year. 
Before  19 13,  France  stood  third  in  furnishing  this  mineral 
to  Germany.  That  year  France  passed  Spain  and  stood 
second,  exporting  to  Germany  3,811,000  tons  from  the  Briey 
basin,  only  700,000  tons  less  than  the  amount  which  Ger- 
many imported  from  Sweden  that  year. 

The  war  enormously  increased  Germany's  need  for  iron 
ore  as  she  had  to  produce  munitions,  not  only  for  her  own 
armies  but  also  for  her  allies.  And  then  the  British  blockade 
cut  off  her  usual  supply  from  Spain.  Francis  Laur,  author 
of  the  book,  "La  France,  Reine  de  Fer "  (France,  the 
Queen  of  Iron),  in  a  letter  to  a  daily  newspaper  of  Paris, 
L'QLuvre,  published  May  9,  19 16,  cited  official  figures  pub- 
lished by  the  Union  of  German  Iron  Industries  which 
showed  that  the  production  of  cast  iron  in  Germany  dropped 
from  1,561,944  tons  in  July,  1914,  to  587,661  tons  in  Aug- 
ust of  that  year.  But  in  October,  19 14,  the  production  be- 
gan to  increase  steadily,  until  in  August,  19 15,  it  had  reached 
the  total  of  1,050,610  tons  —  only  500,000  tons  less  than  it 
had  been  before  the  war  when  Germany  had  had  to  import 

3 


44  per  cent,  of  her  iron  ore  from  Sweden,  France  and  Spain. 

What  was  the  cause  of  this  increased  production,  despite 
the  blockade?  For  one  thing,  the  war  had  given  Germany 
control  of  the  French  iron  basin  of  Briey  from  which  she 
had  imported,  in  191 3,  3,811,000  tons  of  ore.  How  much 
iron  did  Germany  get  from  Briey  during  the  war?  Accord- 
ing to  a  statement  made  on  the  floor  of  the  French  Chamber 
of  Deputies  on  Feb.  14,  19 19,  by  Mr.  Loucheur,  a 
munition  maker,  who  during  the  latter  part  of  the  war  was 
Minister  of  Munitions  and  who  since  the  armistice  has  been 
Minister  of  Industrial  Reorganization,  the  Germans,  by 
their  exploitation  of  the  Briey  basin  during  the  war,  took 
14,000,000  tons  of  iron  ore  from  its  mines,  only  a  little  less 
than  they  would  have  imported  from  it  in  normal  times 
of  peace. 

The  Germans  themselves  during  the  war  fully  realized 
how  important  to  them  was  the  possession  and  exploitation 
of  the  Basin  of  Briey.  Here  is  an  extract  from  a  confiden- 
tial memorandum,  addressed  in  May,  19 15,  to  Chancellor 
Bethmann-Hollweg  by  the  six  great  industrial  and  agricul- 
tural associations  of  Germany: 

"  If  the  production  of  raw  iron  and  steel  had  not  been 
doubled  since  the  month  of  August,  the  continuation  of  the 
war  would  have  been  impossible.  ...  As  raw  material 
for  the  fabrication  of  these  quantities  of  raw  iron  and  steel, 
the  ore  of  Lorraine  takes  a  place  of  more  and  more  im- 
portance. From  this  ore  at  present  from  60  to  80  per  cent, 
of  our  raw  iron  and  steel  is  made.  If  the  production  of  the 
Lorraine  ore  was  disturbed,  the  war  would  be  practically 
lost." 

In  referring  to  "  Lorraine  ore "  the  Germans  included 
both  the  mineral  of  Lorraine  proper  and  that  of  Briey,  for 
the  two  regions,  geologically,  form  one  basin.  The  memo- 
randum goes  on  to  say,  with  regard  to  peace  terms : 

"  If  the  fortress  of  Longwy  should  be  returned  to  the 
French  with  the  numerous  blast  furnaces  of  that  region, 
and  if  a  new  war  should  break  out,  the  German  blast  fur- 

4 


naces  near  there  would  be  demolished  in  a  few  hours  by  a 
few  long  range  cannons. 

"  A  glance  at  the  map  shows  that,  for  instance,  the  mine 
of  Jarny  (in  the  Briey  basin)  is  35  kilometers  (about  20 
miles)  from  Verdun  and  that  the  mineral  concession  the 
fartherest  west  of  Landres  and  Conflans  begin,  at  the  most, 
only  15  miles  from  Verdun.  Does  any  one  really  believe 
that  the  French,  in  another  war,  would  neglect  to  place  long 
range  artillery  at  Longwy  and  at  Verdun  and  by  such  care- 
lessness permit  us  to  continue  to  extract  our  iron  ore? 

"  The  security  of  the  German  empire  demands  then,  im- 
periously, the  possession  of  all  the  iron  mines  of  the  Lor- 
raine basin,  with  the  fortresses  of  Longwy  and  Verdun, 
without  which  this  region  cannot  be  defended." 

It  will  be  recalled  that  the  famous  offensive  of  the  Crown 
Prince's  armies  against  the  French  fortress  of  Verdun  was 
launched  the  next  year.  Various  reasons  have  been  advanced 
as  to  the  purpose  of  this  tremendous  effort.  According  to 
Hindenburg's  version,  Verdun  was  attacked  in  order  to  pre- 
vent the  French  from  striking  at  the  Basin  of  Briey  —  the 
Achilles'  heel  of  the  German  front,  which  was  but  20  miles 
east  of  the  fortress.  Here  is  the  official  German  com- 
munique for  October  27,  1916: 

"  Verdun,  in  the  case  of  an  allied  offensive,  would  have 
facilitated  the  re-capture  of  the  mineral  Basin  of  Briey 
which  is  so  precious  to  us,  and  would  have  resulted  in  men- 
acing the  fortress  of  Metz,  the  taking  of  which  would 
have  permitted  the  conquest  of  the  industrial  and  mining 
regions  of  German  Lorraine,  thus  depriving  us  of  the  most 
vital  part  of  our  war  industry." 

In  December,  19 16,  the  Popular  Gazette  of  Cologne, 
writing  on  war  aims,  declared :  "  The  narrow  band  of  ter- 
ritory of  the  Briey  basin  is  important  to  guarantee  our  mili- 
tary and  economic  independence,  especially  in  time  of  war. 
We  have  need  of  Briey  to  assure  us  our  necessary  supply 
of  mineral,  and  we  have  the  right  and  the  duty  to  demand 
it   during   the   peace   negotiations." 

5 


Then  Dr.  Schenkler  of  the  Sarrebruck  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce wrote  a  long  study  of  the  Basin  of  Briey  which  was 
published  in  the  Berlin  Lokal  Anzeiger,  Feb.  13  and  25 
and  March  4,  19 17,  in  which,  after  pointing  out  that  before 
the  war  Germany  imported  44  per  cent,  of  her  iron  ore 
and  that  since  the  war  imports  from  Spain  had  been  re- 
duced to  nothing  and  Sweden  had  been  unable  to  furnish 
her  usual  28.55  Per  cent-  oi  the  normal  German  importations, 
he  went  on  to  say: 

"  And  so  it  must  be  regarded  as  extraordinary  good  luck 
that  Germany  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  has  been  in 
possession  of  the  Basin  of  Briey,  for  without  the  French 
mineral  the  German  industry  would  have  found  it  impossible 
to  make  munitions  enough  for  ourselves  and  allies.  Natu- 
rally, that  which  has  been  an  advantage  for  us  has  been 
on  the  contrary  a  disadvantage  for  France." 

Finally,  in  19 18,  the  Allies  began  an  offensive  against 
Briey.  And  here  is  order  No.  10,519  of  the  Fifth  German 
Army,  dated  Oct.  1,  19 18,  and  signed  by  General  Von  Der 
Marvitz: 

"  After  information  which  we  possess,  the  enemy  is  going 
to  attack  the  Fifth  Army  to  the  east  of  the  Meuse  and  try 
to  push  on  toward  Longuyon.  The  aim  of  this  attack  is 
to  cut  the  Longuyon-Sedan  line,  the  most  important  artery 
of  the  Army  of  the  West.  What  is  more,  the  enemy  intends 
to  make  it  impossible  for  us  to  exploit  the  Basin  of  Briey 
on  which  depends,  in  large  measure,  our  production  of  steel. 
And  so  once  more  it  is  on  the  Fifth  Army  that  falls  the 
heaviest  task  during  the  course  of  the  fighting  during  the 
next  few  weeks.  It  is  upon  it  that  the  security  of  the 
fatherland  reposes.  It  is  upon  the  immovable  resistance  of 
the  Verdun  front  that  the  fate  of  a  great  part  of  the  west- 
ern front,  and  perhaps  the  fate  of  our  people,  depends." 

These  citations  show  how  vital  to  German  success  in  the 
war  the  Germans  themselves  considered  the  control  of  the 
Basin  of  Briey.    That  the  French  Government  realized  the 

6 


importance  of  this  region  is  shown  by  the  Bulletin  des 
Armies,  published  Dec.  6,  191 6,  by  the  minister  of  war, 
which  said :  "  The  Basin  of  Briey  appears  to  constitute  for 
our  enemies  a  precious  reserve.  It  is  indeed  impossible  not 
to  be  struck  by  the  fact  that  the  quantity  of  mineral  im- 
ported by  Germany  from  foreign  countries  before  the  war 
represents  just  about  the  amount  which  the  Basin  of  Briey 
was  then  furnishing  to  us.'* 

That  General  Pershing's  staff  was  cognizant  of  the  strate- 
gic value  of  Briey  may  be  seen  from  a  conversation  which  I 
had  at  Chaumont,  April  14,  19 19,  with  Brigadier  General 
Conner,  chief  of  the  section  of  the  American  General  Staff 
which  had  charge  of  military  operations  during  the  war. 

"  Is  it  true,"  I  asked  him,  "  that  this  district  of  Briey 
which  the  Germans  held  was  so  important  to  Germany  for 
munitions  that  she  could  not  have  lasted  for  six  months  had 
the  Allies  taken  it  ?  "     He  replied : 

"  I  don't  know  about  the  six  months'  limit,  but  the  capture 
of  it  would  have  sounded  the  doom  of  Germany." 

It  is  evident  from  these  quotations  that  the  Germans,  the 
French  and  the  Americans  all  realized  the  tremendous  im- 
portance of  the  Briey  iron  basin  during  the  war.  And  yet 
the  astounding  fact  remains  that  until  the  American  offen- 
sive in  the  last  month  of  the  war  this  vital  sector  of  the 
western  front  was  the  one  noted  for  its  continued  tran- 
quillity.   Why  ? 

"  WHERE  IRON  IS,  THERE  IS  THE  FATHERLAND !  " 

Before  attempting  to  take  up  in  detail  the  question  of  why 
the  Lorraine  front  was  so  quiet  during  the  war,  it  is  neces- 
sary for  a  good  understanding  of  the  problem  to  outline 
more  fully  the  iron  industry  in  German  and  French  Lor- 
raine. As  has  already  been  pointed  out,  before  the  war 
most  of  the  iron  mines  and  smelters  of  these  two  powers 
were  in  the  Lorraine  basin,  on  both  sides  of  the  frontier. 
Now,  some  of  the  French  iron  masters  owned  mining  con- 
cessions and  smelters  in  German  Lorraine  as  well  as  in 

8 


France,  and  the  Germans  had  heavy  interests  in  French 
Briey  as  well  as  in  Lorraine  proper. 

The  De  Wendel  family,  for  instance,  owned  one  single 
property  of  9,000  hectares  (about  22,500  acres)  of  iron 
mining  land,  right  on  the  boundary  line,  about  half  of  it 
in  French  Briey  and  the  remainder  in  German  Lorraine. 
At  Joeuf  in  the  French  Basin  of  Briey  the  family,  with  the 
Creusot  interests  —  the  Krupps  of  France  —  owned  eight 
blast  furnaces  and  also  iron  mines  producing  nearly  a  million 
tons  a  year.  On  the  German  side  of  the  line,  the  De  Wendel 
family  owned  mining  concessions  at  Moyeuvre  and  Hayange, 
producing  3,000,000  tons  of  iron  ore  a  year  and  also  the 
blast  furnaces  and  smelters  established  near  these  mines. 
The  political  boundary  of  1871  separated  the  property,  but 
underground  tunnels  connected  the  De  Wendel  mines  on 
both  sides  of  the  line.  As  the  total  area,  in  both  Germany 
and  France,  of  this  district  which  produced  "  minette,"  as 
this  particular  iron  ore  is  termed,  was  approximately 
72,000  hectares  it  will  be  noted  that  the  De  Wendels  con- 
trolled one  eighth  of  the  entire  basin. 

And  of  what  nationality  is  this  De  Wendel  family?  It 
claims  to  be  French.  One  member  of  the  family,  Francois 
de  Wendel,  is  president  of  the  Comite  des  Forges  (the 
Committee  of  Forges) — the  official  name  of  the  French 
iron  and  steel  combine.  During  the  war,  he  was  a  con- 
servative member  of  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
representing  the  department  of  Meurthe-et-Moselle.  His 
brother,  Charles  de  Wendel,  was  a  naturalized  German  and 
a  member  of  the  German  Reichstag.  He  resigned,  however, 
when  the  war  broke  out,  and  returned  to  France  where  he 
offered  his  services  to  the  Minister  of  War,  who  did  not 
make  use  of  them. 

On  the  German  side,  the  steel  magnate,  Thyssen,  in  1909 
confided  to  Mr.  Le  Chatelier  his  intention  of  having  one  of 
his  sons  become  a  naturalized  Frenchman.  Here  is  the  way 
Le  Chatelier  tells  it  in  his  book,  "  Metallurgy  of  Yester- 
day and  Tomorrow  "  (Metallurgie  d'hier  et  de  demain) : 

9 


"  For  what  reason  did  Mr.  Thyssen  wish  to  make  us  a  gift 
of  one  of  his  sons?  Simply  because  he  was  going  to  do 
us  the  honor  of  installing  himself  in  Normandy  in  order  to 
exploit  our  iron  mines,  and  followed  the  classic  adage  — 
1  Where   iron   is,   there  is  the   fatherland.'  " 

But  Thyssen  had  little  need  of  such  measures  to  protect 
his  interests,  events  of  the  war  would  seem  to  show.  In 
L'CEuvre  of  Paris  of  May  22,  191 7,  Gustave  Tery,  the 
editor,  declared  that  in  the  minutes  of  the  general  meeting 
held  March  14,  191 6,  by  the  blast  furnace  and  steel  mill 
corporation  of  Caen,  originally  published  in  the  financial 
journal,  L 'Information,  March  18,  1916,  "  it  is  specified 
that  the  Thyssen  interests  are  carefully  reserved  in  the  new 
organization.  It  is  understood  that  a  part  of  the  profits 
realized  by  this  company  in  the  making  of  war  munitions 
(for  France)  will  be  put  aside  for  the  Thyssen  group,  and 
that  after  the  war,  automatically  and  legally,  the  Messrs. 
Thyssen  will  receive  this  large  sum.  As  it  is  certain  that 
those  same  Thyssens  work  also  for  the  war  in  Germany, 
these  interesting  metallurgists  receive  their  profits  then  with 
both  hands,  that  is,  from  the  two  sides  of  the  frontier,  from 
furnishing  material  to  Germany  and  to  France.  If  money 
has  no  odor,  steel  has  no  fatherland." 

And  on  Nov.  21,  19 16,  Tery  ran  this  question  in  big  type 
on  the  front  page  of  L'CEuvre  —  a  question  that  has  yet 
to  be  answered: 

"  Whom  do  the  Germans  pay  for  the  mineral  they  are 
extracting  from  the  French  mines  in  Briey?" 

In  all,  the  Germans  owned  eighteen  mineral  concessions 
in  the  Briey  and  Longwy  basins,  and  a  few  more  in  Nor- 
mandy. The  Thyssens  controlled  the  mines  of  Bailly, 
Jouaville  and  Souligny.  The  mines  of  Moutiers  and  of 
Conflans  were  dominated  by  an  international  group,  the 
stock  being  distributed  in  this  proportion:  French,  100; 
Germans,  70;  and  Belgians,  10.  The  German  "  Phonix  " 
group  —  Hasper  and  Koesch  —  controlled  the  French  mines 
at  Jarny  and  at  Sancy.    The  Gelsenkirchmer,  —  tht  enter- 

10 


prise  the  most  considerable  in  the  world,  it  is  said,  after  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation,  —  which  produced  three 
times  more  steel  than  the  Creusots, —  owned  in  France 
the  mines  of  Saint-Pierremont,  Sevey,  Haut-Lay,  Saint-Jean, 
Sainte-Barbe,  Crusne  and  Vallerupt.  Other  German  iron 
masters  owned  the  mines  of  Murville  and  Valleroy.  All  of 
these  concessions  were  in  the  Basin  of  Briey,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  those  of  Sancy,  Crusnos  and  Vallerupt  which 
were  in  the  adjoining  French  Basin  of  Longwy.  From  these 
properties  the  Germans  drew  from  four  to  five  million  tons  of 
iron  ore  each  year  before  the  war,  and  in  addition  they  pur- 
chased from  the  two  districts  of  Briey  and  Longwy  more 
than  three  million  tons  annually. 

That  fact  that  France,  rich  in  iron  ore,  was  poor  in  coal, 
while  Germany  had  plenty  of  coal  in  the  Sarre  basin  with 
which  to  treat  her  minerals,  accounts  in  part  for  this  inter- 
nationalization of  the  steel  industry.  It  is  interesting  to 
note  in  this  connection  how  the  German,  Roechling,  a  sworn 
enemy  of  France,  arrested  as  soon  as  Lorraine  was  occupied 
after  the  armistice,  was  able  to  get  a  foothold  in  the  Briey 
district  before  the  war.  The  Longwy  steel  corporation, 
which  owned  most  of  the  18,000  shares  in  the  mines  of 
Valleroy,  traded  8,000  of  these  shares  to  Roechling  for 
250  shares  in  the  Carl  Alexander  coal  mine  at  Roeswler, 
Germany,  of  which  there  were  in  all  1,000  shares.  Roech- 
ling was  the  biggest  individual  share-holder  in  the  Valleroy 
mines,  while  the  French  company  held  only  a  quarter 
interest  in  the  German  coal  property  as  a  result  of  the 
trade. 

Not  only  did  the  shortage  of  coal  in  France  contribute 
to  internationalization,  but  so  also  did  several  other  factors. 
Germany  was  a  country  il  on  the  make."  Her  business 
was  expanding  rapidly,  pushed  by  the  initiative  and  enter- 
prise of  the  German  industrial  leaders.  They  needed  more 
iron  ore  —  France  had  plenty,  and  what  was  more  natural 
than  to  go  to  that  country  for  the  mineral.  Especially  since 
the  French   mining   and   steel   combine   followed   a  policy 

U 


of  economic  malthusianism,  endeavoring  to  keep  the  supply 
down  so  that  prices  would  remain  high. 

In  each  of  the  European  countries  the  mineral  interests 
were  tending  at  a  rapid  rate,  as  in  the  United  States, 
toward  combination,  centralization  and  internationalization. 
Above  them  all  was  the  famous  international  banking  family 
of  the  Rothschilds,  Jews  by  religion,  barons  of  Germany, 
England,  France  and  Austria  by  business.  And  in  the  in- 
ternational Rothschild  group  when  the  war  began,  210  shares 
were  held  by  the  Krupps. 

In  Germany  there  had  risen  in  the  mineral  world  the 
Metallurgische  Gesellschaft,  or  Metallgesellschaft.  Ac- 
cording to  Professor  Liefman-Lumonde  of  Fribourg-en- 
Brigsau,  this  enterprise  had  founded  the  mineral  company  of 
Liege,  the  auxiliary  company  of  mines  at  Paris,  the  copper 
and  pyrite  company;  controlled,  through  the  American  Metal 
company,  the  nickel  company,  and  controlled  the  French 
aluminum  company  and  the  lead  industry.  In  addition,  it 
had  infiltrated  into  a  great  number  of  other  companies.  It 
was  a  world  power. 

Mr.  Hughes,  prime  minister  of  Australia,  speaking  in 
London  in  191 8,  declared: 

"  It  is  truly  a  tragic,  menacing  and  threatening  thing,  that 
here,  in  this  city,  in  the  heart  of  the  empire,  there  exists  an 
oil  agency  which  is  at  bottom  German. 

11 1  say  then  that  the  enemy  agent  here  to  whom  I  refer 
is  the  English  branch  of  one  of  the  most  powerful  corpora- 
tions the  world  has  ever  seen,  a  combination,  an  octopus 
whose  tentacles  extended,  before  the  war,  over  the  entire 
world  and  whose  heart  was  on  the  Main  at  Frankfort. 

"  It  is  an  organization  which  had  its  outposts  everywhere 
in  the  world,  which  affected  not  only  the  commercial  and  in- 
dustrial life  of  the  world  but  also  its  political  life,  which 
worked  incessantly  for  the  commercial  profit  of  Germany, 
which  reaped  enormous  profits  to  the  benefit  of  Germany. 

"  It  is  called  the  Metallurgische  Gesellschaft;  the  Ameri- 
can Metallurgy  company;  The  Australian  Metallurgy  com- 

12 


pany;  the  African  Metallurgy  company;  and  finally,  in 
Switzerland,  the  Schweizerische  Gesellschaft,  a  double  name, 
sometimes  German,  sometimes  French,  sometimes  in  another 
language,  but  at  bottom,  it  is  always  German. 

"  I  accuse  here  only  the  Metallurgische  Gesellschaft,  the 
great  German  octopus  which  dominated  the  world,  which 
remained  here  during  four  years  of  war,  which  remains  here 
after  the  war  and  which,  I  repeat,  ought  not  to  remain  here 
one  hour  longer." 

INTERLOCKING  DIRECTORATES 

The  French  iron  and  steel  industries  have,  as  elsewhere, 
tended  during  the  last  generation  toward  combination  and 
centralization.  In  1875  there  were  383  iron  smelters  in 
France;  in  1912  there  were  only  208,  although  during  that 
period  the  production  of  iron  and  steel  had  quintupled,  go- 
ing from  900,000  tons  to  4,900,000  tons  a  year.  The  aver- 
age capacity  of  a  smelter  in  1875  was  2,350  tons  and  in 
19 1 2  it  was  21,700  tons.  The  industry  was  also  concen- 
trated geographically.  In  1875  the  production  was  scat- 
tered over  57  departments  of  France.  As  we  have  seen, 
when  the  war  broke  out,  92  per  cent,  of  French  iron  ore  was 
taken  from  the  single  department  of  Meurthe-et-Moselle. 
What  is  more,  75  per  cent,  of  French  cast  iron  was  pro- 
duced in  this  same  department,  and  75  per  cent,  of  the  steel 
in  it  and  the  department  of  the  Nord,  on  the  Belgian  frontier. 

The  great  French  steel  foundries  possessed  their  own  iron 
mines  which  they  themselves  exploited.  And  they  were  seek- 
ing to  own  and  operate  mines  to  supply  them  with  the  coal 
they  needed. 

The  Comite  des  Forges  (Committee  of  Forges,  or  more 
freely,  association  of  iron  masters),  was  organized  first  in 
1864.  Twenty  years  later,  in  1884,  it  was  reorganized.  Its 
aim,  according  to  its  charter,  was  exclusively  "  the  study 
and  defence  of  the  economic,  industrial  and  commercial 
interests  of  the  iron  industry." 

When  the  war  began,  the  combine  had  252  members,  rep- 

13 


resenting  97  per  cent,  of  the  French  iron  industry,  93  per 
cent,  of  the  steel  industry  and  a  total  capital  of  $230,000,- 
000.  Its  personnel  numbered  200,000  workmen  whose  pay 
for  19 1 2  amounted  to  a  total  of  400,000,000  francs,  an 
average  of  $400  a  year  for  each  employe. 

But,  of  the  252  members  of  the  association,  14  furnished 
about  three-fifths  of  the  French  cast  iron  and  two-thirds  of 
the  steel.  The  Acieries  de  la  Marine  and  Denain  et  Anzin 
were  the  leading  producers  of  cast  iron  and  steel,  respectively, 
with  De  Wendel  et  Cie  second  in  both  industries.  The 
big  munition  plant  of  Schneider  et  Cie  stands  seventh  on  the 
list  for  production.  The  board  of  directors  of  the  iron 
and  steel  combine  has  28  members,  representing  the  big  firms. 
The  honorary  president  is  Eugene  Schneider.  The  president 
is  Francois  de  Wendel  and  the  secretary,  Robert  Pinot. 

Subsidiary  committees  and  associations  have  been  organized 
in  the  last  20  years  for  the  makers  of  such  specialties  as 
steel  rails,  armor  plate,  munitions,  etc.  Together  they  form 
part  of  a  broader  federation,  "  L'Union  des  Industries  Me- 
tallurgiques  et  Minieres  "  (The  Union  of  the  Metallurgical 
and  Mining  Industries). 

MONOPOLY 

Juxtaposed  to  the  industrial  organization  is  a  commercial 
association,  whose  functioning,  though  in  form  independent, 
is  in  fact  more  or  less  solidly  connected  through  interlocking 
directorates  with  the  Committee  of  Forges.  These  associa- 
tions, called  "  comptoirs,"  are  formed  for  the  sale  of  specific 
products.  The  Metallurgical  Comptoir  of  Longwy,  for  in- 
stance, sold  only  crude  castings.  When  a  comptoir  is  organ- 
ized the  productive  capacity  of  each  plant  holding  member- 
ship in  it  is  determined  and  orders  are  then  pro-rated.  All 
orders  for  steel  and  iron  must  pass  through  the  comptoirs. 
Through  this  tight  commercial  and  industrial  organization, 
the  Committee  of  Forges  has  virtually  an  absolute  monopoly 
of  the  iron  ai  4  steel  business  of  France. 

In  the  Cham   t  of  Deputies,  January  24,  19 1 9,  the  organ- 

14 


ization  was  thus  defined  by  Edouard  Barthe,  a  Socialist 
deputy:  "The  Committee  of  Forges  is  a  powerful  organiza- 
tion which  controls  all  the  underground  production  and 
can  thus  impose  upon  French  consumers  the  draconian 
prices  which  it  is  pleased  to  fix.  It  is  made  up  of  only  a 
few  adherents."  He  went  on  to  point  out  that  the  most 
narrow  connections  united  the  war  material  and  armor 
plate  trusts  from  which  independent  shops  and  the  arsenals 
of  the  state  bought  most  of  their  raw  materials.  They  have 
the  same  office  address  —  63  Boulevard  Haussmann,  Paris, — 
and  the  same  general  secretary,  Mr.  Robert  Pinot,  who  at 
the  same  time  is  general  secretary  for  the  Committee  of 
Forges,  the  syndicate  of  railway  material  producers,  the  syn- 
dicate of  hydraulic  power  plants,  and  finally  of  the  confed- 
eration which  united  all  of  these  combines,  the  Union  of 
the  Metallurgical  and  Mining  Industries. 

GOLD    AND   IRON 

If  one  considers  that  all  of  these  trusts  are  not  only  cen- 
tered in  the  same  man  at  the  same  address  but  that  in 
addition  behind  each  of  the  great  steel  and  iron  enterprises 
are  one  or  two  great  banks  —  L'Union  Parisienne  behind 
Creusot  (the  munition  maker),  the  Credit  Lyonnais  behind 
the  Acieries  de  la  Marine,  the  Comptoir  d'Escompte  be- 
hind the  Chantiers  de  la  Mediterranee,  etc. —  it  will  be  seen 
what  deep  roots  the  industry  of  war  has  made  in  the  entire 
economic  organization  of  France  and  on  what  formidable 
allies  it  can  count. 

What  was  the  policy  of  the  Committee  of  Forges  in  the 
years  preceding  the  war  ?  Sheltered  by  a  tariff  which  Deputy 
George  Chaulet  declared  was  "  not  only  protective  but  pro- 
hibitive," the  combine,  according  to  Deputy  Barthe,  "  prac- 
tised an  economic  malthusianism  of  the  sort  the  most  danger- 
ous for  the  nation.  With  France  so  well  endowed  —  better 
endowed  even  than  foreign  countries  for  the  metal  indus- 
tries,—  it  voluntarily  prevented  the  development  of  our  me- 
chanical   industry    by    practising    the    dumping    with    raw 

15 


material  which  the  Germans  practised  with  manufactured 
products ;  and  so  effectively  that  the  dumping  of  the  Commit- 
tee of  Forges  has  been  as  effective  as  the  German  dumping 
in  ruining  French  industry  and  developing  the  prosperity  of 
German  industry.  The  Committee  of  Forges  dumped  raw 
material,  iron  and  cast  iron,  which  it  sold  cheaper  to  the 
Germans  than  to  the  French.  Our  raw  materials  returned 
to  us  from  Germany  in  the  form  of  manufactured  articles." 

LEAD 

And  now  turn  from  iron  and  steel  to  some  of  the  other 
minerals  necessary  in  the  war  industries.  Take  lead.  The 
Penarroya  mine  in  Spain  furnishes  most  of  this  mineral  in 
Europe.  Up  to  1909  the  Rothschild  group  controlled  this 
mine  and  nearly  all  of  the  Spanish  production  of  lead. 
After  the  Agadir  incident  of  that  year  the  Metallgesellschaft 
took  control,  though  a  member  of  the  French  Rothschild 
family  still  held  membership  in  the  council  of  administrators. 
From  then  on  to  19 14  the  lead  France  needed  for  war  pur- 
poses came  to  it  from  Spain  by  way  of  Germany. 

NICKEL   NOT  CONTRABAND 

Not  only  did  the  Germans  control  lead  but  also  zinc,  and 
what  is  truly  strange  and  extraordinary  is  that,  according  to 
Deputy  Barthe,  the  Metallgesellschaft  also  controlled  alum- 
inum, a  mineral  which  is  found  almost  entirely  in  French 
soil.  What  is  more,  the  German  international  metal  trust 
had  almost  complete  control  of  nickel.  Nearly  all  of  the 
nickel  of  the  world  is  possessed  equally  by  two  French 
firms:  the  blast  furnaces  of  Noumea  and  the  Rothschild 
group.  But  this  nickel,  in  great  part,  was  under  the  de- 
pendance  of  the  Metallgesellschaft  for  nearly  all  of  it  was 
smelted  in  Germany.  Nickel,  it  so  happens,  is  one  of  the 
products  the  most  indispensable  for  the  fabrication  of  steel 
for  heavy  artillery.     Such  steel  needs  2  per  cent,  nickel  in  it. 

Deputy  Ballande,  president  and  founder  of  the  Noumea 
company  —  the  only  one  independent  of  the  international 

16 


trust,  represented  in  Europe  before  the  war  by  the  Metallge- 
sellschaf t  —  on  the  floor  of  the  French  Chamber,  Jan.  24, 
19 19,  urged  that  that  body  demand  an  explanation  from 
the  government  of  the  fact  that  "  there  was  a  ship,  loaded 
with  nickel  mineral,  the  property  of  the  House  of  Krupp, 
which  was  seized  by  the  French  navy  and  then  released  under 
the  most  extraordinary  conditions." 

SUBLIME   INNOCENCE 

Here  is  the  incident,  as  reported  by  Senator  Henry  Be- 
renger  in  Paris-Midi  in  191 5: 

"The  21st  of  last  September  (1914),  a  three-masted 
Norwegian  boat,  the  Bennesloet,  loaded  with  nickel  sailed 
for  Hamburg,  Germany,  and  the  24th  of  September  it 
was  stopped  by  the  French  ship,  Dupetit-Thouars,  and 
brought  to  Brest.  Half  of  its  cargo  had  been  paid  in  advance 
by  Krupp.  Despite  the  opinion  of  the  prize  court,  this 
ship  was  released  and  directed  toward  Copenhagen.  From 
where  did  the  ship  come?  It  came  from  New  Caledonia,  a 
French  colony !  " 

The  order  to  release  the  ship  came  from  the  central  gov- 
ernment. The  administration  explained  that  it  was  sent  be- 
cause the  shipper  of  the  cargo,  the  Mont  Do  company,  had 
promised  to  have  it  unloaded  in  Norway,  and  because  nickel 
then  was  not  on  the  list  of  contraband.  The  decision  served 
as  a  precedent,  and,  according  to  Senator  Berenger,  a  num- 
ber of  ships  were  allowed  to  pass,  thus  Oct.  6,  19 14,  the 
Rambeau;  Oct.  12,  the  Martindick;  Nov.  6,  the  Tubantia; 
Nov.  24,  the  Beria,  and  the  senator  follows  this  enumera- 
tion with  an  "  etc." 

Nickel  was  not  contraband.  Nor  was  cotton  nor  azotic 
acid  nor  lead.  Nickel  and  lead  were  not  contraband  of 
war  —  and  the  Metallgesellschaft  had  a  monopoly  of  their 
production  in  Europe.  But  contrary  to  the  French  ruling, 
Deputy  Barthe  says:  "At  the  same  period,  September  24, 
19 14,  the  English  stopped  a  ship  loaded  with  lead,  en  route 
for  Antwerp.    The  shipper  was  an  English  firm,  the  desti- 

17 


nation  was  the  Metallgesellschaft.  The  cargo  was  not  con- 
traband of  war  .  .  .  but  the  English  admiralty  court  or- 
dered it  held." 

THE   FRENCH   TRUST   FAVORS   KRUPPS 

Consider  now  the  products  of  the  hydro-electric  industry 
of  France  —  f erro-silicon  and  cyanamide,  both  necessary  in 
the  manufacture  of  munitions.  The  general  secretary  of 
the  hydro-electric  trust,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  Robert 
Pinot,  the  general  secretary  of  the  Committee  of  Forges,  and 
its  head  office  was  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Committee  of 
Forges.  This  trust  controlled  42,000  tons  of  the  French 
output,  against  7,000  tons  produced  by  independent  concerns. 

Germany,  which  lacked  waterfalls,  did  not  have  a  domes- 
tic supply  of  ferro-silicon  sufficient  for  its  war  industries. 
And  so  on  Feb.  23,  19 12,  the  French  syndicate  agreed  to 
furnish  Germany  with  the  ferro-silicon  it  needed  for  its  war 
stock. 

"  I  have  here  the  contract  which  was  signed  with  Krupp 
several  years  before  the  war  and  by  which  the  big  cannon 
maker  benefited  by  a  reduction  in  price  of  40  marks  on  the 
ton,"  declared  Deputy  Barthe  on  the  floor  of  the  Chamber, 
Jan.  24,  19 1 9,  in  speaking  oi  ferro-silicon.  "  What  is  serious, 
is  that  when  the  French  industry  treated  with  the  con- 
structor of  German  cannon,  it  knew  that  it  was  contracting 
for  the  production  of  war  munitions.  I  will  say  more:  It 
knew  that  it  was  furnishing  Krupp  with  stock  for  a  war 
that  was  coming.  Better  yet:  it  knew  that  the  war  would 
break  out  about  1914." 

This  accusation  drew  a  statement  from  former  Premier 
Viviani,  who  explained  the  case,  which  had  come  before 
the  court  of  assises  during  his  administration,  in  these  words 
in  the  Chamber: 

"  The  letters  which  had  been  seized  at  the  homes  of  those 
whom  I  had  had  indicted  permit  one  to  ask  if  they  had  not 
negotiated  with  Germany,  up  to  19 14,  if  my  memory  is 
exact,  agreements  from  which  it  resulted: 

18 


"  i.  That  ferro-silicon  was  delivered; 

"  2.  That,  on  the  demand  of  Krupp,  this  stock  of  ferro- 
silicon  was  brought  to  the  door  of  his  plant,  so  that  in  case 
of  mobilization  he  would  have  almost  immediate  command 
of  it; 

"3.  That  the  French  agents  of  the  company  who  were 
in  Germany  were  forbidden  to  deliver  this  ferro-silicon  to 
Russian  agents,  that  is  to  say,  that  our  allies  were  deprived 
of  war  materials  of  which  they  might  have  need; 

"  4.  That  there  was  the  customary  stipulation  that  a 
strike  might  annul  the  contract  but  that  war  between  only 
two  nations  was  not  considered  an  annulling  cause,  so 
that,  if  war  had  existed  between  Germany  and  France  alone, 
or  between  Germany  and  Russia,  the  contract  would  have 
continued  in  force." 

It  was  in  these  conditions  that  the  case  came  before  the 
court  of  assises,  said  Mr.  Viviani,  and  then  the  advocate 
general  dropped  it.    And  Mr.  Viviani  added: 

"  Although  I  am  pleased  to  render  homage  to  the  Com- 
missioner of  the  Government,  Mr.  de  Meur  (who  repre- 
sented the  Administration),  I  regret  nevertheless  that  the 
advocate  general,  Mr.  Wattine,  had  the  accusation  aban- 
doned. [Warm  applause  from  all  parts  of  the  Chamber.] 
I  know  that  the  advocate  general  doesn't  have  to  take  orders 
and  that  he  finds  in  the  traditions  of  our  jurisprudence  the 
right  to  drop  an  accusation  upon  his  own  responsibility.  I 
only  regret  that  Advocate  General  Wattine  did  not  exer- 
cise the  right  to  read  to  the  jury  at  any  time  during  the 
session,  the  letters  held  by  the  prosecuting  attorney  so  that 
—  if  no  punishment  seemed  to  him  apposite  —  the  country 
might  have  derived  that  desirable  benefit  in  wartime:  the 
placing  by  a  magistrate  of  the  stigma  of  moral  shame  upon 
those  who  had  signed  such  documents." 

The  correspondence  to  which  Mr.  Viviani  referred  was 
that  between  the  Frenchman  Riva-Berni,  and  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Krupp.  Here  is  the  analysis  of  the  letters,  as 
made  by  the  Government  Commissioner: 

19 


"  The  result  was  that  Krupp  had  demanded  that  he  be 
assured  of  a  permanent  stock  of  1,000  tons  [of  ferro-silicon] 
in  the  vicinity  of  his  mills,  in  view  of  a  war  which  he  con- 
sidered was  near;  that  Ehrensberger,  the  director  of  the 
house  of  Krupp,  had  specifically  stated  that  he  wished  to 
be  guaranteed  in  case  of  mobilization  and  in  case  of  war. 
Opinion  in  Germany  seemed  to  have  been  that  a  war  was 
fatally  coming  in  an  indefinite  future,  but  in  any  case,  be- 
fore the  end  of  this  Krupp  contract,  that  is  to  say  in  1916." 
[Letter  of  Riva-Berni  to  Rosenbaum,  February  14, 
1912.] 

"  In  his  letter  the  previous  day,  the  14th  of  February,  to 
FLugo  Koller,  the  same  Riva-Berni  had  stated  that  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Germans  it  was  thought  that  a  European  war 
would  break  out  within  two  years  (between  19 12  and  19 14) 
and  that  in  the  general  mobilization  Krupp  would  have  great 
difficulty  in  getting  his  supplies. 

11  Copies  of  these  letters  were  communicated  to  Mr. 
Giraud- Jordan  in  whose  office  they  were  found. 

"  Moreover,  Riva-Berni  did  not  hide  at  any  time  that  he 
believed  in  the  certainty  of  a  war,  and  that  in  the  memoir 
which  he  deposed,  February  13,  current  year,  on  page  76, 
he  said  that,  habituated  to  travel  in  Germany,  he  had  fore- 
seen the  war  for  a  long  time,  that  he  knew  the  war  was 
near,  as  did  all  those  who  took  the  trouble  to  notice  what 
was  happening." 

BUSINESS    IS    BUSINESS 

Thus,  this  French  business  man  who  knew  the  war  was 
coming  none  the  less  helped  supply  the  Krupps  with  war 
material.  According  to  the  contract  with  the  French  trust, 
Krupp  was  to  have  a  war  stock  of  1,000  tons  of  ferro-sili- 
con delivered  to  him.  UUsine,  the  official  journal  of  the 
Committee  of  Forges,  says  that  Germany  had  need  of  only 
2,000  tons  of  ferro-silicon  a  year.  How  much  did  the 
Krupps  get  as  a  result  of  this  contract?  During  the  two 
years  preceding  the  war,  up  to  July  28,  19 14,  the  German 

20 


munition  maker  received  6,000  tons  from  France,  1,000  tons 
each  year  more  than  was  normally  needed.  Six  thousand 
tons  of  ferro-silicon  is  sufficient  to  treat  600,000  tons  of 
steel.  The  Krupps  wanted  a  u  war  stock."  Evidently  they 
got  it. 

The  Frenchman,  Giraud-Jordan,  at  whose  office  the  above 
letters  were  found,  was  a  prominent  member  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Forges  and,  according  to  his  own  statement  made 
during  the  war,  he  was  **  the  real  representative  at  Paris 
of  the  international  group  of  which  the  Lonza  was  the 
centre." 

The  Lonza  is  a  hydro-electric  company  with  headquarters 
at  Basel,  Switzerland.  Before  the  war  Austro-German  in- 
fluences had  gained  control  of  the  majority  of  its  stock  and 
placed  at  its  head  a  German  named  Freydel.  French  capi- 
talists, among  them  Giraud- Jordan,  still  retained  some  stock 
in  the  company.  Giraud-Jordan  was  a  member  of  the  board 
of  directors  of  this  company  and,  during  the  war,  it  is 
charged  he  also  remained  a  director  of  the  Swiss  company 
of  Hafslund,  whose  plant  was  in  Norway  and  which,  as  a 
neutral  company,  was  selling  its  product  to  Germany. 

When  the  war  broke  out  the  Lonza  company  sold  its 
product,  chiefly  cyanamide,  to  German  munition  makers. 
The  French  hydro-electric  trust  was  brought  before  a  French 
court  martial  on  the  charge  of  having  shipped  600,000 
pounds  of  cyanamide  to  the  Lonza  company  in  Switzerland 
in  January,  19 15.  This  case  brought  out  a  strong  protest 
from  Robert  Pinot,  general  secretary  of  the  trust  and  of 
the  Committee  of  Forges,  and  it  elicited  this  comment  from 
Giraud-Jordan,  in  a  note  written  by  him  which  was  found 
in  his  office: 

"  On  leaving  the  Committee  of  Forges,  I  indicated  to 
Mr.  Sautter  that  in  my  opinion,  if  the  Lonza  company  or 
the  companies  affiliated  with  it  are  indicted,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  make  the  Swiss  government  intervene  through 
diplomatic  channels." 

The  causing  of  a  diplomatic  incident  between  two  nations 

21  -v 


apparently  was  but  a  trifle  to  the  international  financiers 
during  the  war. 

Other  notes  written  by  Giraud- Jordan  indicated  how  the 
trust  had  used  its  influence  to  bribe  experts  in  the  case.  The 
trust  claimed  that  though  the  cyanamide  had  been  shipped 
it  had  first  been  denatured,  making  it  useless  in  the  produc- 
tion of  explosives.  This  was  denied  by  others,  but  the  trust 
was  acquitted. 

ACROSS   THE    BLOCKADE 

Finally,  Giraud- Jordan  resigned  from  the  Board  of  Di- 
rectors of  the  Lonza  company.  Here  is  his  letter,  dated 
March  13,  19 15,  addressed  to  the  Electrical  Plants  of  the 
Lonza,  incorporated: 

"  Gentlemen : 

"  I  had  at  first  hoped  that  our  reciprocal  relations 
could  have  continued  unchanged  by  this  terrible  war.  But 
I  see  today  that  duty  forces  me  to  reserve  all  my  forces  for 
business  in  France  and  obliges  me  to  leave  the  companies, 
where  my  presence,  in  the  present  circumstances,  could  dis- 
turb my  action  and  diminish  my  influence  in  the  sphere  in 
which  they  ought  to  be  concentrated.  .  .  . 

u  If,  some  day,  international  relations  became  better  again, 
perhaps  we  can  resume  the  collaboration  which  was  based 
on  times  of  peace." 

And  the  same  day,  this  Frenchman,  who  resigned  with 
such  evident  regret  from  a  company  controlled  by  and  work- 
ing for  the  Germans,  wrote  to  a  Mr.  A.  Vogt  at  Laupen- 
strasse  4,  Berne,  as  follows: 

"Dear  Sir: 

"  Following  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Koller  (an  Austrian)  I 
have  sent  to  the  Lonza  a  letter  of  resignation  of  which  I 
here  include  a  copy.  Nevertheless,  I  shall  continue  to  be 
greatly  interested  in  the  Lonza,  of  which  I  remain  the  larg- 

22 


est  shareholder  after  Mr.  Wacker,  and  I  have  asked  him  to 
continue  to  send  me  through  you  as  intermediary  the  docu- 
ments of  the  council  of  administration,  such  as  the  minutes, 
reports  and  monthly  balances,  and  I  will  be  obliged  to  you 
if  you  will  receive  them  as  in  the  past  and  transmit  them  to 
me  when  you  have  the  opportunity. 

"  In  the  same  way,  I  am  sending  you  in  triplicate  the 
documents  of  the  Bozel  company,  and  I  ask  you  to  send  two 
copies  to  the  Lonza,  one  of  which  should  be  addressed  to 
Dr.  Koller,  who  has  asked  me  to  continue  to  keep  him  in- 
formed of  the  business  of  our  company." 

On  March  15th,  1915,  Vogt  answered  by  accepting  the 
commission. 

Thus,  while  Giraud- Jordan  resigned  from  the  board  of 
directors,  he  remained  one  of  the  largest  stockholders  in  the 
Lonza  company  which  was  working  for  Germany.  Under 
cover  of  his  resignation,  the  French  financier  continued  to 
keep  in  touch  with  the  German  and  Austrian  financiers. 

HOW   FRENCH    METAL   SUPPLIES   WERE   CONTROLLED 

So  much  for  the  international  organization  of  financial 
and  mining  men.  Now,  to  return  to  the  iron  and  steel  situ- 
ation in  France  after  the  war  had  begun.  With  the  Ger- 
mans in  possession  of  the  Briey  basin,  the  French  were 
forced  to  depend  largely  upon  the  small  basin  left  in 
Meurthe-et-Moselle.  This  was  not  at  all  sufficient  for  her 
needs.  The  French  iron  and  steel  industry  was  disorgan- 
ized and  France  was  faced  with  the  pressing  need  of  im- 
porting raw  iron  and  steel. 

The  government  charged  the  Committee  of  Forges  with 
the  duty  of  importing  19,000  tons  of  metal  from  England 
each  month  in  order  to  supply  the  French  concerns.  Seven 
months  passed  and  not  a  ton  had  been  imported  by  the  steel 
combine.  Its  announced  policy  at  that  time,  as  given  in 
a  confidential  circular,  was  opposed  to  the  accumulation  of 
stocks  for  fear  that  this  would  hurt  the  resumption  of  busi- 

23 


ness.  It  imported  nothing  from  England,  but  some  of  the 
independent  concerns,  tired  of  waiting,  on  their  own  initiative 
and  despite  governmental  restrictions,  succeeded  in  import- 
ing steel  from  the  British  Isles. 

Then  the  system  was  changed.  A  single  purchasing  agent 
at  London  was  appointed  by  the  French  government.  All 
orders  for  importations  of  iron  and  steel  went  through  his 
hands.  And  who  was  he?  Humbert  de  Wendel,  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Committee  of  Forges  and  a  brother  of  Francois 
de  Wendel.  Who  was  the  military  attache  at  London,  de- 
tailed to  check  Mr.  de  Wendel,  the  purchasing  agent?  Gen- 
eral de  la  Panouze,  the  brother-in-law  of  Mr.  de  Wendel. 

Who  was  it  in  the  ministry  of  munitions  in  France  who 
had  the  duty  of  checking  every  kilogram  of  metal  which 
came  into  the  country?  It  was  Captain  Esbrayat,  director 
of  the  Demachy  bank,  an  institution  of  the  Committee  of 
Forges.  Captain  Esbrayat  was  mobilized  in  the  department 
of  munitions  where  he  held  the  office  of  general  secretary  of 
the  commission  of  woods  and  metals. 

Who  handled  the  distribution  of  the  metal  imported?  A 
branch  of  the  Committee  of  Forges,  the  Comptoir  d'exporta- 
tion  —  bureau  of  exportation.  And  who  was  the  director 
of  this  bureau  during  a  long  period  of  the  war  up  to  Sept. 
23>  J9i7?  An  under-director  of  the  Committee  of  Forges, 
a  man  named  Goldsberger,  born  in  Zurich,  Switzerland,  the 
son  of  an  industrial  magnate  of  Berlin,  Felix  Goldsberger. 

In  the  debates  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  Feb.  i,  19 19, 
it  was  admitted  by  De  Wendel  and  by  Loucheur,  minister  of 
industrial  reorganization,  that  Goldsberger  was  of  German 
origin,  but  they  both  maintained  that  he  was  a  naturalized 
Swiss.  Deputy  Barthe  declared  that  the  French  secret  serv- 
ice had  never  been  able  to  find  trace  of  his  naturalization. 
Goldsberger  had  been  connected  with  the  Committee  of 
Forges  since  1904. 

Shortly  after  Mr.  Loucheur  was  appointed  minister  of 
armament  he  gave  this  order,  he  said,  on  September  23, 
1917: 

24 


"  I  can  not  understand  how  the  bureau  (of  exportation) 
has  taken  a  foreigner  for  so  delicate  a  position.  It  is  im- 
possible to  allow  this  situation  to  continue.  Consequently 
do  what  is  necessary  with  the  briefest  delay  and  report  to  me." 

And  it  was  only  then  that  this  Goldsberger,  a  man  of 
undoubted  German  origin,  was  removed  from  the  position 
of  acting  chief  of  the  French  government  monopoly  of 
metal. 

PATRIOTEERS 

Meanwhile,  the  Committee  of  Forges  had  been  accused 
of  speculation  and  profiteering  —  of  having  artificially  raised 
the  price  of  the  steel  it  imported.  The  charges  were  re- 
referred  to  the  Committee  of  Markets  of  the  French  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies,  late  in  19 15.  Now,  Francois  de  Wendel, 
the  deputy,  was  a  member  of  this  particular  committee.  The 
different  matters  referred  to  it  were  apportioned  among  the 
members,  each  with  a  certain  thing  to  investigate  and  re- 
port on.  De  Wendel  pointed  out  that  his  special  experience 
qualified  him  to  investigate  profiteering  in  steel  better  than 
any  of  the  other  deputies.  And  he  was  told  to  look  into  the 
charges  which  had  been  made  and  report.  In  the  fall  of  19 18, 
after  he  had  been  elected  president  of  the  Committee  of 
Forges,  he  turned  the  matter  over  to  another  deputy.  Three 
years  had  passed  —  and  not  a  report  had  been  made  by  De 
Wendel. 

It  was  then  a  member  of  the  Committee  of  Forges,  Hum- 
bert de  Wendel,  who  was  the  sole  purchasing  agent  of 
France  for  iron  and  steel  in  London.  It  was  his  brother- 
in-law  and  a  banker  of  the  Committee  of  Forges  who 
checked  him.  It  was  a  branch  of  the  Committee  of  Forges, 
the  bureau  of  exportation,  with  a  Swiss  of  admitted  Ger- 
man origin  at  its  head,  which  distributed  the  metal  imported 
by  the  single  purchasing  agent.  And  it  was  a  deputy,  an- 
other member  of  the  De  Wendel  family,  who  was  a  mem- 
ber and  later  president  of  the  Committee  of  Forges,  to  whom 
was  given  the  investigation  of  the  charges  that  the  steel  trust 

25 


was  profiteering  during  the  war  and  who  kept  the  matter 
pigeon-holed  for  three  years.  And  these  are  not  all  of  the 
key  positions  which  the  Committee  of  Forges  —  the  steel 
combine  —  filled  during  the  war,  as  will  be  shown  later. 

THE    BRIEY  INVESTIGATION 

Such  was  the  geological  and  industrial  situation  with  re- 
gard to  iron  and  steel  in  France  and  Germany  when  the  war 
broke  out  —  the  iron  mines  and  steel  mills  of  both  countries 
grouped  on  the  frontier  which  divides  the  two  nations,  a 
powerful  trust  controlling  the  situation  on  each  side  of  the 
line,  and  Germans  owning  mines  in  France  and  the  French 
owning  mineral  properties  in  Germany,  with  the  industrial 
magnates  of  both  powers  working  in  more  or  less  close 
harmony. 

Now,  the  fact  that  the  Briey  basin  from  which  came  nearly 
all  of  France's  iron  was  allowed  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
Germans  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  and  no  attempts  were 
made  to  disturb  their  exploitation  of  the  French  mines  for 
more  than  two  years,  during  which  time  the  French  steel 
combine  had  a  tight  monopoly  on  all  importations  of  metal 
into  France,  has  given  rise  in  France  to  several  questions. 
They  are,  in  brief: 

1.  Why  was  so  much  of  the  French  mineral  production 
concentrated  in  the  department  of  Meurthe-et-Moselle,  on 
the  Lorraine  boundary  ? 

2.  Since  it  was  concentrated  there,  why  did  not  the 
French  fortify  Briey? 

3.  Why  was  Briey  not  defended  when  the  war  broke 
out? 

4.  Why  was  the  Lorraine  front  so  quiet  a  sector  on  the 
French  front?  Why  did  not  the  French  make  an  offensive 
in  the  direction  of  Briey  or  at  least  bomb  it  from  airplanes  ? 

Before  attempting  to  answer  these  questions,  a  short  re- 
sume of  how  they  were  brought  to  public  attention  may  be 
of  some  interest.  According  to  the  story  told  by  Fernand 
Engerand,  a  Conservative  deputy,  in  the  Chamber  on  Feb. 

26 


27 


I,  19 1 9,  the  Briey  situation  came  to  his  notice  in  1915  and 
in  February  of  that  year  he  wrote  an  article  concerning  it 
which  was  published  in  the  Correspondent.  He  waited,  but 
it  brought  no  response  from  those  in  authority.  As  he  had 
no  connections  with  the  General  Staff,  he  sent  a  note  to 
it  by  a  member  of  the  French  Academy  (one  of  the  Immor- 
tals), calling  attention  to  the  importance  of  Briey.  Still 
nothing  was  done.  He  called  it  to  the  attention  of  the  staff 
three  times  —  always  in  vain.  And  then  he  found  that  the 
staff  officer  who  received  his  notes  was  —  an  iron  master, 
mobilized  on  the  General  Staff!  In  despair,  he  lectured  on 
the  subject  and  wrote  concerning  it  for  UEcho  de  Paris,  a 
conservative,  not  to  say  reactionary,  daily  of  Paris. 

About  the  same  time  in  1915  that  Engerand  began  his 
campaign,  the  question  of  Briey  was  taken  up  by  Gustave 
Tery,  editor  of  the  liberal  Paris  daily,  UCEuvre.  Later 
the  question  was  given  more  publicity  by  a  conservative  sen- 
ator, Henry  Berenger,  in  the  daily  Paris-Midi.  In  January, 
1 919,  the  Socialist  Deputy,  Edouard  Barthe,  interpellated 
the  Government  on  the  subject  of  the  Briey  basin  and  the 
Committee  of  Forges  for  two  days,  and  was  sustained  in 
important  parts  of  his  charges  by  Deputies  Engerand,  Flan- 
din  and  Eynac,  all  Conservatives,  and  by  former  Premier 
Viviani,  a  Liberal.  Minister  Loucheur  replied  for  the  Gov- 
ernment on  Feb.  14  and  agreed  to  Barthe's  demand  that 
a  parliamentary  investigating  committee  be  appointed  to  look 
into  the  matter.  Most  of  the  information  given  in  this  pres- 
ent article  was  obtained  from  the  record  in  the  Journal 
Officiel  —  the  Congressional  Record  of  France  —  of  these 
debates,  as  the  report  of  the  investigating  committee,  if  it 
has  been  made,  has  not  been  received  here. 

ENTER  THE  CENSOR 

Two  things  worked  against  those  who  raised  the  question 
of  Briey  during  the  war.  One  was  the  censorship,  the  other, 
a  counter-campaign  in  the  press.  As  an  instance  of  the 
censorship,  on  April  6,  19 16,  Gustave  Tery  wrote  an  edi- 

28 


torial  in  L'CEuvre  on  the  Committee  of  Forges,  entitled 
"  Alsace-Lorraine  and  Metallurgy."  The  censor  formally 
prohibited  the  publication  of  the  article,  save  for  the  one 
word,  "metallurgy,"  in  the  title  which  he  did  not  cut  out! 
As  is  usual  in  such  cases,  L'CEuvre  went  to  press  that  morn- 
ing with  a  blank  space  where  the  editorial  was  to  have  been 
printed,  headed  by  the  word  u  Metallurgy,"  which  had  es- 
caped the  censor's  shears.  Just  as  the  press  was  starting, 
a  squad  of  police  under  a  government  official  appeared  in 
the  shop  and  destroyed  the  whole  front  page  form,  simply 
because  of  the  single  word  "  Metallurgy."  The  paper  had 
to  make  a  new  front  page  form  and  was  several  hours  late 
that  morning  with  its  deliveries.  Such  was  the  way  the  cen- 
sorship worked. 

Then,  in  June,  1916,  there  began  in  Le  Temps  a  direct 
counter-attack  against  those  who  pointed  to  the  strategical 
importance  of  Briey.  Now,  Le  Temps  is  in  France  what 
The  Times  is  in  England  and  what  the  New  York  Times 
is  in  the  United  States.  It  is  the  largest  and  the  most  ex- 
pensive newspaper  published  in  Paris,  costing  three  cents 
the  copy  while  all  the  others  sell  for  two  cents.  It  is  very 
conservative  in  policy  and  is  the  organ  of  the  upper  middle 
class  and  of  the  financial  interests. 

These  articles  in  Le  Temps  were  signed  by  Max  Hoschil- 
ler.  In  them  he  ridiculed  the  arguments  of  Engerand  and 
Tery  and  the  others  who  were  demanding  that  Briey  be  at- 
tacked and  called  their  story  the  "  legend  of  Briey."  His 
first  article,  published  June  1,  19 16,  began  with  these 
words : 

"  There  are  some  who  affirm  that  the  Germans  have  in- 
stalled at  Briey  a  veritable  arsenal  from  which  they  draw 
in  profusion  raw  material  for  the  fabrication  of  their  muni- 
tions. Behold  the  reality  in  all  its  brutality :  To  make  their 
munitions,  the  Germans  have  no  need  of  a  single  ton  of  iron 
ore  from  the  Basin  of  Briey."     [Italics  in  original.] 

That  gives  the  tenor  of  the  whole  series  of  articles.  And 
now,  who  was  this  Max  Hoschiller,  whose  name  sounds  as 

29 


French  as  Kelly  sounds  German?  He  was  born  in  Odessa, 
Russia,  the  son  of  an  Austrian  father  of  Polish  origin,  and 
of  a  Russian  mother.  He  was  married  to  a  French  woman 
and  was  allowed  to  remain  in  France  during  the  war  upon 
presentation  of  a  certificate  of  his  origin  by  the  committee 
of  Polish  volunteers.  He  was  not  a  soldier  during  the  war, 
although  he  says  that  he  tried  to  enlist  with  the  Allies. 

STRANGE    BEDFELLOWS 

In  an  open  letter  to  Deputy  Barthe  from  A.  Merrheim, 
head  of  the  miners'  union  in  France  and  one  of  the  revolu- 
tionary French  labor  leaders,  which  was  published  in  Bon- 
soir,  Feb.  8,  1919,  Merrheim  stated  that  Hoschiller  was  a 
revolutionist  and  one  of  his  close  friends  and  that  he,  Merr- 
heim, was  the  one  who  had  urged  Hoschiller  to  write  the 
articles  in  Le  Temps  and  had  furnished  him  the  statistics 
and  data  which  he  used.  Merrheim  believed  that  those  who 
were  saying  that  possession  of  Briey  would  end  the  war 
were  deceiving  the  public  and  leading  an  extremely  dan- 
gerous campaign. 

"  I  explained  to  Hoschiller,"  wrote  Merrheim  in  Bonsoir, 
"  That  the  mineral  of  Briey  represented  a  minimum  part  of 
the  needs  of  Germany  for  iron  ore,  and  that  the  ore  received 
from  Sweden  was  of  a  much  greater  indispensability  to  Ger- 
many in  the  making  of  munitions  and  special  steel. 

"  I  insisted  on  the  enormous  number  of  thousands  of  men 
whom  one  would  have  to  sacrifice  in  order  to  retake  and  hold 
this  basin,  because  of  the  fortifications  of  Metz  which  could 
bombard  it  with  ease.  With  the  figures  of  the  production  of 
the  Briey  mines,  I  showed  him  that  it  was  with  difficulty 
that  the  German  production  of  cast  iron  could  be  reduced 
and  that  that  would  have  no  influence  on  the  duration  of  the 
war. 

"  This  conviction  I  still  have  today,  for  those  who  have 
spoken  of  the  Basin  of  Briey  have  often  confounded  the 
richness  underground  with  the  existing  production." 

The  war  makes  strange  bedfellows.     The  publication  of 

30 


these  articles  in  the  grave  and  conservative  Temps  by  Ho- 
schiller  at  the  instigation  of  Merrheim  is  fully  as  remarkable 
as  would  be  the  publication  in  the  New  York  Times  of  a 
series  of  articles,  the  purpose  of  which  was  in  close  harmony 
with  the  wishes  of  the  financial  interests,  written  by  Emma 
Goldman  at  the  request  of  Bill  Haywood. 

As  for  the  statements  of  Hoschiller  and  Merrheim  with 
regard  to  the  value  of  Briey  to  the  Germans,  they  are  in 
direct  opposition  to  the  opinions  expressed  by  the  Germans 
themselves  which  I  have  already  quoted.  And  in  answer  to 
Hoschiller,  Deputy  Engerand  declared: 

"  It  is  known  that  at  the  moment  this  affirmative  was  made 
[that  of  Hoschiller  quoted  above]  each  day,  and  from  only 
three  of  the  18  mines  of  Briey,  6,000  tons  of  mineral  were 
being  shipped  into  Germany.  I  have  the  written  proof  that 
the  [French]  iron  magnates  interested  knew  that  the  Ger- 
mans were  exploiting  their  mines." 

If  any  additional  proof  is  needed  of  the  falseness  of  Ho- 
schiller's  argument,  it  is  supplied  by  Minister  Loucheur, 
whom  I  have  already  quoted  as  having  admitted  on  the  floor 
of  the  Chamber,  Feb.  14,  19 19  —  after  the  war  was  over 
and  the  French  were  again  in  possession  of  Briey  —  that 
the  Germans  took  14,000,000  tons  of  ore  from  Briey  dur- 
ing the  war.  And  that,  he  went  on  to  say,  "  is  the  equiva- 
lent of  what  we  exported  to  Germany  before  the  war." 

When  one  considers  the  overwhelming  evidence  of  the 
vital  importance  of  Briey  to  the  Germans,  it  is  not  strange 
that  many  Frenchmen  suspected  the  presence  of  a  "  nigger 
in  the  woodpile  "  of  Le  Temps.  Especially  if  one  remembers 
that  when  the  Hoschiller  articles  were  appearing  the  Ger- 
man offensive  against  Verdun  had  been  practically  broken 
and  the  French  general  staff  was  considering  plans  for  a 
counter-offensive.  It  was  to  Hoschiller  that  the  Socialist 
Deputy  Barthe  had  reference  when  he  declared  in  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies : 

"  I  affirm  that  the  manoeuvres  and  lies  of  an  Austrian  who 
resided  in  France  during  the  war  were  for  the  purpose  of 

3i 


turning  away  our  military  authorities  from  the  project  of 
relieving  Verdun  and  carrying  on  an  offensive  in  the  direction 
of  the  Briey  basin." 


ECONOMIC   MALTHUSIANISM   OR 


Such  were  the  conditions  in  which  the  question  of  Briey 
was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  French  public.  Let  us 
now  examine  this  question,  as  I  have  divided  it,  in  four  parts. 
First,  why  was  the  mineral  production  of  France  concen- 
trated along  the  German  frontier?  The  answer  to  that 
seems  easy  —  because  the  mineral  deposits  were  situated  on 
that  frontier.  But  listen  to  Deputy  Engerand,  who  de- 
clared in  the  French  Chamber,  Feb.  i,  19 19: 

"  It  was  a  blunder  without  name  and  without  equal  to 
have  left  nearly  all  of  our  metallurgical  and  mineral  pro- 
duction concentrated  on  one  frontier  and  on  a  frontier  as 
menaced  as  that  of  Lorraine.  .  .  .  And  it  was  this  blunder 
which  just  failed  to  transform  our  sublime  victory  of  the 
Marne  into  a  Pyrrhic  victory,  since  our  army  was  quickly 
stopped  through  lack  of  munitions,  and  the  Government  in 
this  tragic  situation  could  not  provide  it  with  any.  There 
is  the  origin  of  all  our  metallurgical  and  industrial  difficulties 
of  the  war,  and  it  is  a  great  miracle,  and  perhaps  the  great- 
est miracle,  that  we  have  been  able  to  keep  from  succumb- 
ing to  them,  and  have  even  —  but  at  what  a  price !  —  tri- 
umphed over  them.  We  must  never  lose  sight  of  this 
situation  when  we  wish  to  judge  the  men  and  events  of  that 
epoch.     [Cries  of  'Well  said!  well  said!  '] 

11  In  the  first  place,  France,  before  the  war,  was  one  of  the 
richest  countries  in  iron  ore.  It  had  iron  everywhere,  east, 
west,  in  the  Pyrenees  and  in  Normandy.  The  mills  natu- 
rally are  situated  near  the  mines,  since  the  blast  furnaces 
consume  twice  as  much  mineral  as  coke.  There  was  not 
a  country  where  the  metallurgical  industries  could  have  been 
more  naturally  and  more  easily  deconcentrated  than  France. 

11  Why,  then,  was  all  of  our  iron  and  steel  production,  the 
essential  elements  in  the  national  defense,  left  concentrated 

32 


in  the  east,  right  on  the  frontier,  under  the  cannon  of 
Metz?" 

No  reasons  have  been  advanced  for  this  dangerous  concen- 
tration, except  that  the  Committee  of  Forges  with  its  policy 
of  economic  malthusianism  was  more  concerned  with  the 
making  of  profits  than  with  the  developing  of  the  mining 
industry  throughout  France  so  that  the  country  might  be 
better  protected  when  the  war  which  everybody  —  and 
especially  the  industrial  magnates,  as  has  been  shown  —  ex- 
pected finally  began. 

So  much  for  that  question.  Now  for  the  second:  Since 
the  iron  and  steel  industry  was  allowed  to  be  concentrated 
on  this  frontier,  why  was  it  not  protected  by  fortifications? 
The  Germans,  it  should  be  recalled,  had  heavily  fortified 
the  cities  of  Metz  and  Thionville  in  German  Lorraine.  The 
French,  before  the  war,  had  finished  fortifying  the  region 
surrounding  Nancy  near  the  Lorraine  frontier.  That  city 
was  never  taken  by  the  Germans  during  the  war.  Why, 
then,  was  not  the  region  of  Briey,  far  more  important  than 
that  of  Nancy,  fortified  ?     Listen  again  to  Deputy  Engerand : 

"  By  fortifying  and  even  simply  by  defending  the  vital 
point  (Briey)  of  the  frontier,  we  would  have  held  under  our 
cannon  the  raw  material  essential  to  German  metallurgy.  A 
long  war  would  have  been  rendered  impossible  for  Germany. 
The  German  metallurgists  have  themselves  many  times 
recognized  this  fact;  they  have  declared  that  if  we  had 
guarded  this  corner  of  the  frontier,  the  war  would  have 
been  finished  in  six  months  with  the  defeat  of  Germany." 

WHEN  IS  A  FORT  NOT  A  FORT? 

It  has  been  argued  that  the  treaty  of  Frankfort  which 
ended  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870  prohibited  the 
French  from  building  any  new  forts  along  the  Alsace-Lor- 
raine frontier.  If  that  is  so,  how  were  the  French  able  to 
fortify  Nancy?  It  is  almost  as  close  to  the  frontier  as  is 
Briey.    And  if  Nancy,  why  not  Briey? 

33 


But  fortifications  are  of  little  use  in  modern  warfare, 
some  argue.  Yet  the  heavily  fortified  cities  of  Verdun  and 
Nancy  held  out  in  spite  of  all  attack.  And  if  fortifications 
are  of  so  little  value,  why  was  the  presence  of  the  fortifica- 
tions at  Metz  used  so  often  as  an  excuse  for  not  making  an  of- 
fensive in  the  direction  of  Briey? 

In  the  old  defensive  military  plan  of  General  Sere  de 
Riviere  the  regions  of  Briey  and  Nancy  were  to  be  abandoned 
at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  for  reasons  of  foreign  policy. 
But  at  that  time,  in  1875,  the  value  of  the  mineral  in  the 
Briey  basin  was  not  known  and  the  mining  industry  had  not 
been  installed  there.  Representatives  of  the  French  staff  say 
that  it  was  ignorant  of  the  economic  importance  of  the  basin. 
This  some  generals  deny,  saying  that  they  realized  the  stra- 
tegic value  of  iron  in  war.  But  even  so,  the  Committee  of 
Forges  and  the  government  bureau  of  mines  knew  the  vital 
relation  of  the  basin  to  the  making  of  war  munitions.  Why 
didn't  they  inform  the  government  and  the  general  staff? 
There  is  no  record  of  their  having  done  this. 

The  answers  to  these  two  questions  remain  clouded  in 
obscurity.  Turn,  then,  from  this  ante-bellum  period,  and 
consider  the  third  question:  When  the  war  began,  why  was 
not  some  attempt  made  by  the  French  troops  to  defend  the 
Briey  basin?  Here  is  what  Deputy  Engerand  has  to  say 
with  regard  to  it: 

"  This  part  of  the  frontier  where  lay  the  soul  of  our 
mineral  industry  was  open.  It  was  without  defense,  it 
was  abandoned  without  a  fight.  The  region  of  Briey  before 
the  war  was  outside  the  zone  of  defense.  There  was  only 
a  battalion  of  chasseurs  (infantry)  installed  there,  and  that 
was  not  done  until  191 3,  if  I  am  not  mistaken.  This  battal- 
ion had  its  orders  to  fall  back  at  the  first  alarm.  It  seems 
established  that  the  abandonment  of  Briey  was  part  of  the 
plan  of  operation  of  our  general  staff. 

"  It  is  necessary  to  tell  the  truth  and  it  is  perfectly  untrue 
to  pretend  —  I  see  Monsieur  Viviani  at  his  bench  and  he  will 
refute  my   statement   if   I    am   wrong  —  that   it   was   the 

34 


decision  taken  by  the  government  the  30th  of  July,  19 14, 
ordering  our  troops  to  drop  back  10  kilometers  from  the 
frontier,  which  caused  Briey  to  be  abandoned.  No!  The 
abandonment  of  Briey  had  been  decided  upon  before. 

"  It  seems  to  me  beyond  doubt  that  our  general  staff  had 
not  been  informed  on  the  economic  importance  of  this  cor- 
ner of  Briey  and  that  it  did  not  know  what  a  strategic  trump 
card  it  constituted  for  France. 

"  The  German  general  staff,  however,  knew  its  im- 
portance, and  two  days  before  the  declaration  of  war,  it 
occupied  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg;  one  day  before 
the  declaration  of  war,  it  occupied  Briey  and  the  important 
points  in  the  basin.  It  realized  that  here  was  the  feeble 
point  in  Germany,  the  weakness  in  her  armor.  Indeed,  it 
was  here  that  Germany  found  all  of  her  mineral." 

SANS   PEUR   ET  SANS   REPROCHE 

Viviani,  who  was  premier  of  France  when  the  war  started, 
addressed  the  Chamber  at  the  close  of  Engerand's  speech, 
Feb.  1,  19 19,  and  in  an  eloquent  explanation  of  his  policy 
during  that  epoch,  said  that  the  Government  for  the  diplo- 
matic reason  of  proving  to  the  world  that  France  was  not 
the  aggressor  had  ordered  its  troops  to  drop  back  10  kilo- 
meters (8  miles)  all  along  the  German  frontier.  The  plan 
of  the  French  general  staff,  he  declared,  was  to  have  these 
troops  retire  25  kilometers  from  the  frontier,  so  that  the 
Government's  order  really  saved  15  kilometers  which  the 
staff  would  have  abandoned. 

As  Briey  is  very  close  to  the  frontier  this  order  gave  the 
whole  of  the  region  to  the  Germans  without  a  fight.  Thus 
it  was  that  the  Germans  came  into  possession  of  it. 

Then,  when  the  war  changed  from  one  of  movement  to 
one  of  position  and  both  sides  dug  themselves  in  and  settled 
down  to  a  war  of  attrition  and  of  munitions,  it  was  noted 
by  soldiers  and  civilians  that  Germany  was  getting  from  the 
Lorraine  basin  —  from  French  Briey  as  well  as  the  German 
side  —  most  of  the  iron  necessary  for  her  war  industries, 

35 


and  the  fourth  question  arose:  Why  did  this  sector  of  all 
sectors  remain  so  quiet?  Why  was  no  offensive  made  in 
the  direction  of  Briey?  Why  was  not  some  effort  made  to 
disturb  the  exploitation  of  these  mines  by  bombing  them 
from  airplanes? 

It  seems  obvious  that  in  a  war  of  munitions  all  possible 
means  should  have  been  taken  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
producing  iron,  especially  when  their  iron  district  —  the 
Briey-Thionville  basin  —  was  within  easy  reach.  But  this 
was  not  done. 

Deputy  Engerand  went  so  far  as  to  say  on  May  2,  19 16, 
in  UCEuvre:  "The  war  would  have  been  finished  at  one 
stroke  if,  at  the  beginning,  we  had  made  in  this  region 
(Briey)  an  advance  of  7  kilometers  on  a  front  of  15.  We 
would  have  cut  Germany  from  her  mineral  and  she  could 
not  have  procured  it  elsewhere." 

Why  did  not  the  French  make  an  offensive  in  the  direction 
of  Briey?  I  asked  General  Conner,  Pershing's  chief  of  staff 
for  military  operations,  that  question. 

"  They  never  had  the  numerical  superiority  to  undertake 
an  offensive  there,"  he  answered. 

"  A  greater  numerical  superiority  was  needed,  then,  for  an 
attack  on  Lorraine  than  for  one  at  the  Chemin  des  Dames?  " 

"  No."  At  that  point,  our  conversation  was  unfortunately 
interrupted. 

THE  AGREEMENT   FOR  A   LORRAINE   OFFENSIVE 

Now,  as  Major  General  Verraux,  who  commanded  the 
42nd  Division  of  the  French  Second  Army  on  the  Briey 
front  when  the  war  began,  pointed  out  in  an  article  in 
UCEuvre,  Feb.  16,  1919,  the  French  general  staff  tried  its 
fortune  with  offensives  a  little  everywhere  along  the  west- 
ern front  —  Champagne,  the  Vosges,  the  central  part  of 
the  Woevre,  the  Argonne,  the  Artois  —  except  in  the  region 
of  Briey.  And  this  remarkable  exception  made  him  ask, 
"Why?"  —  a  question  which  he  was  unable  to  answer. 
He  went  on  to  say,  however,  that  on  various  occasions  the 

36 


officers  from  his  army  in  liaison  with  the  general  staff  had 
called  to  its  attention  the  feasibility  of  an  offensive  against 
Briey. 

General  Sarrail,  who  was  in  command  of  this  Second 
Army  on  the  Lorraine  front  in  19 14,  had,  indeed,  projected 
an  offensive  in  the  direction  of  Spincourt-Longuyon-Longwy, 
the  success  of  which  would  have  given  the  French  possession 
of  the  Briey  basin,  or  at  least  would  have  made  difficult  if 
not  impossible  the  exploitation  of  the  Lorraine  mines.  But 
General  Sarrail,  as  General  Verraux  remarks,  was  not  in 
the  good  graces  of  the  general  staff.  When  the  plan  was 
submitted,  the  staff  sent  back  a  voluminous  refutation,  based 
chiefly  on  the  argument  that  it  was  impossible  to  manoeuvre 
in  this  region.  This  difficulty,  however,  had  not  prevented 
the  Germans  from  advancing  14  kilometers  in  two  days  in 
this  district.  The  upshot  of  it  all  was  that  the  projected 
offensive  never  materialized  and  on  January  3,  19 15,  Gen- 
eral Sarrail  was  replaced  by  General  Gerard.  And  the  iron 
mining  Basin  of  Briey  remained  in  tranquillity. 

It  is  urged  by  some  that  the  fortifications  of  Metz  made 
it  impossible  to  capture  Briey  by  an  offensive.  That  may 
or  may  not  be  true.  French  military  authorities  differ  with 
regard  to  this  subject. 

But,  as  General  Verraux  says,  whether  the  offensive  re- 
sulted in  the  capture  of  Briey  or  not,  such  activity  in  that 
sector  would  have  had  the  vital  effect  of  so  disturbing  and 
disorganizing  the  work  behind  the  German  lines  that  it 
would  have  been  impossible  for  the  Germans  to  continue 
their  exploitation  not  only  of  Briey  but  also  of  a  large  part 
of  the  Lorraine  mines  and  smelters  across  the  frontier. 

General  Malleterre,  who  commanded  a  brigade  along 
this  Briey  front  in  19 14  and  has  the  distinction,  notable 
for  an  officer  of  his  rank,  of  having  been  badly  wounded  in 
action,  made  this  comment  in  Le  Temps,  January  31,  1917: 
"  Perhaps  it  was  thought  dangerous  to  begin  a  premature 
and  uncertain  battle  in  these  industrial  regions,  resulting 
in  their  immediate  destruction.     This  destruction  certainly 

37 


would  have  been  better  than  to  leave  them  to  be  exploited 
by  the  Germans." 

Even  if  it  be  conceded  that  an  offensive  against  Briey  was 
wholly  impracticable,  there  remained  still  another  method 
by  which  the  French  could  have  disturbed  the  German  ex- 
ploitation of  the  Briey  and  Lorraine  mines  and  smelters. 
What  is  more,  with  very  little  injury  to  the  mines  them- 
selves their  production  of  ore  for  the  Germans  could  have 
been  cut  almost  to  nil.  That  statement  is  made  on  the  au- 
thority of  the  president  of  the  Committee  of  Forges,  Deputy 
Francois  de  Wendel,  himself.  The  method  ?  —  Bombing  the 
mines  very  frequently  from  airplanes. 

After  having  denied  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on  Feb. 
I,  1 9 19,  that  because  of  his  interests  on  the  Lorraine  frontier 
he  had  ever  intervened  to  prevent  either  an  offensive  against 
Briey  or  the  bombardment  of  the  district,  de  Wendel  de- 
clared : 

"  On  the  contrary,  I  will  say  that  it  was  I,  myself,  who, 
by  my  own  hand,  pointed  out  on  the  maps  and  plans  of 
mines  and  smelters,  in  particular  of  those  I  direct,  the  vital 
points  which  should  be  hit  by  bombardment. 

"  This  bombardment,"  he  added,  "  was  evidently  possible, 
but  could  it  attain  the  results  which  certain  ones  hoped  from 
it?  "  And  he  went  on  to  say  that  the  occupation  of  Briey 
after  the  armistice  showed  that  the  mines  and  smelters  there 
had  suffered  little  damage  from  the  bombardments  which 
they  did  receive  late  in  the  war.    And  then  he  said : 

"  I  do  not  want  any  one  to  deduce  from  my  words  that  I 
am  opposed  to  these  bombing  expeditions.  I  say,  on  the 
contrary,  that  they  have  rendered  great  service,  and  in  par- 
ticular I  wish  to  point  out,  because  I  was  able  to  notice  the 
effects  in  Lorraine,  that  they  obtained  important  results  in 
the  disorganization  of  the  exploitation  of  the  basin  by  the 
use  of  the  system  of  one  of  our  colleagues,  Mr.  Laurent 
Eynac.  He  told  us,  you  remember,  that  bombardments  from 
time  to  time  by  powerful  squadrons  did  not  give  the  results 
expected  and  that,  if  we  substituted  for  them  nightly  bom- 

38 


bardments  multiplied  at  frequent  intervals,  we  could  com- 
pletely disorganize  work  and  render  it  practically  impossible. 
"  This  result  has  been  obtained.  ...  I  myself,  a  few 
weeks  before  the  speech  by  Mr.  Laurent  Eynac,  received 
through  a  repatriated  citizen  a  communication  from  the  di- 
rector of  one  of  our  establishments  in  Lorraine  in  which  he 
told  me  of  the  negative  result  of  the  heavy  bombardments 
and  pointed  out  the  disorder  and  inquietude  into  which  the 
workmen  were  thrown  by  the  frequently  repeated  bombing 
expeditions.  That  was  the  system  of  Mr.  Laurent  Eynac. 
I  hastened  to  give  this  letter  to  General  de  Castelnau  and  I 
do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  upon  re-entering  Alsace-Lorraine 
I  found  a  certain  pleasure  in  hearing  this  director  tell  me 
that  he  could  notice  the  effect  of  his  communition." 

BRIEY   IMMUNE 

The  bombardments  of  which  de  Wendel  speaks  were  made 
late  in  the  war.  Referring  to  the  earlier  years  of  the  strug- 
gle, Deputy  Barthe  declared  in  the  Chamber  on  February 
I :  **  I  have  affirmed  that,  during  the  war,  a  general  was  of- 
ficially reprimanded  for  having  bombarded  the  district  of 
Briey  by  airplanes,  and  that  at  one  period  of  the  war  the 
military  chiefs  forbade  the  aviators  to  bomb  this  basin 
(Briey).  Among  those  who,  not  wishing  to  give  in  to  such 
orders  because  they  noticed  the  activity  of  the  Germans  in 
the  Briey  basin,  went  and  bombarded  it,  I  believe  some  have 
been  punished." 

He  was  then  interrupted  by  Deputy  Flandin,  a  conserv- 
ative who  served  at  Verdun  as  an  artillery  officer,  who 
stated:  "  During  this  difficult  period  [the  latter  part  of  1916] 
we  soldiers  at  this  front  often  wondered  why  our  aviation, 
which  was  so  active  during  the  battle  of  Verdun,  had  not 
been  ordered  to  intervene  and  bombard  the  mines  and  smel- 
ters, from  which  arose  immense  clouds  of  smoke  which  we 
saw  on  clear  days  covering  the  horizon  in  the  direction  of 
Conflans." 

And  so,  Deputy  Flandin  said,  on  December  23,  19 16,  he 

39 


went  to  the  headquarters  of  General  Guillaumet,  command- 
ing the  Second  Army,  and  explained  the  situation,  giving  him 
a  detailed  map  of  the  Briey  mines  and  smelters.  A  few  days 
later  he  and  his  comrades  were  overjoyed  to  see  that  a  squad- 
ron of  the  Second  Army  had  bombarded  the  mines  of  de 
Wendel  at  Joeuf.  But  no  other  such  bombardments  fol- 
lowed. Puzzled,  he  returned  to  the  army's  headquarters. 
There  the  chief  of  staff  told  him  that  the  general  had  been 
ordered  to  cease  these  operations  for  two  reasons,  which 
Flandin  gave  as  follows :  "  Because  Joeuf,  it  seemed,  was 
not  in  the  sector  of  the  Second  Army  [laughter  in  the 
Chamber]  and  because  the  general  staff  reserved  to  itself 
alone  the  right  to  give  orders  of  this  kind  to  the  bombing 
squadrons. 

.-  I  was  profoundly  astonished  and  chagrined,  the  more 
so  because  I  knew,  from  what  my  friends  in  the  aviation 
service  who  had  bombarded  Joeuf  had  told  me,  the  opera- 
tion had  been  done  with  relative  ease,  with  efficacy  and 
without  losses." 

Deputy  Flandin  then  met  General  Lyautey  who  had  been 
to  the  general  staff  headquarters  and  had  found  that  the 
value  of  bombing  the  Briey  region  finally  had  been  recog- 
nized and  that  40  bombing  expeditions  had  been  sent  over 
it  between  November  22,  1916  and  February  19,  19 17.  He 
closed  his  speech  with  these  words : 

"  But  during  27  months  the  Germans  were  able,  without 
being  disturbed,  to  extract  millions  of  tons  of  iron  ore  for 
their  munition  factories." 

Aristide  Briand  then  intervened,  and  said  that  he  was 
premier  during  this  period  and  that  he  and  Albert  Thomas, 
Minister  of  Munitions,  had  on  several  occasions  brought  to 
the  attention  of  the  general  staff  the  importance  of  bombing 
these  war  industries  of  Germany. 

The  startling  fact  remains  that  for  the  first  27  months  of 
the  war  the  Briey  basin  was  free  from  bombing,  though,  ac- 
cording to  Deputy  Laurent  Eynac,  who  during  the  war  was 
especially  occupied  with  aviation  bombing,  only  a  few  air- 

40 


planes  were  needed  to  trouble  efficaciously  the  German  ex- 
ploitation of  Briey.  In  19 17  the  bombing  of  the  district 
began,  Deputy  Flandin  said.  But  how  was  this  bombing 
carried  on  ?  Speaking  of  the  period  between  February  9  and 
October  18,  191 7,  Deputy  Eynac  said  in  the  Chamber  on 
Feb.  14,  1919: 

"  The  orders  of  the  objectives  to  bombard  were  given  to 
the  bombing  group  in  execution  of  a  bombing  plan,  a  secret 
document  established  under  the  direction  of  Lieutenant 
Lejeune,  at  that  time  attached  to  the  aviation  section  of  the 
group  of  armies  of  the  East.  This  plan  received  the  appro- 
bation of  the  Grand  General  Staff.  Frequently  in  telephone 
messages  or  in  visits  to  the  bombing  squadrons,  Lieutenant 
Lejeune,  who  indicated  the  objectives  for  the  day  or  for  the 
moment,  repeated  the  order  prohibiting  the  aviators  to  at- 
tack certain  objectives  situated  within  the  blockaded  railroad 
lines."      [Exclamations  in  the  Chamber.] 

Now,  who  was  this  Lieutenant  Lejeune,  who  had  the  direc- 
tion of  the  bombing  operations  against  Briey  when  they 
finally  were  begun?  According  to  Deputy  de  Wendel's 
own  admission,  Lejeune  was  an  employe  of  the  Committee 
of  Forges. 

Always,  it  would  seem,  when  iron  and  steel  are  con- 
cerned, the  strategical  positions,  be  they  governmental  or 
military,  are  filled  by  this  same  source,  the  Committee  of 
Forges. 

GERMANY   RECIPROCATES 

Such,  then,  is  the  mystery  of  the  iron  Basin  of  Briey,  but 
it  should  not  be  considered  alone.  Coal  is  fully  as  important 
to  a  nation  at  war  as  is  iron,  and  if  France  delayed  to  attack 
the  Lorraine  iron  basin,  Germany  on  the  other  hand  made 
little  attempt,  it  seems,  to  disturb  the  exploitation  by  the 
French  of  their  coal  mines  in  the  Basin  of  Bruay  in  the  de- 
partment of  Pas-de-Calais.  In  a  letter  published  in 
U Information,  the  Paris  financial  journal,  February  16, 
19 1 9,  credited  to  Major  de  Grandmaison,  a  Conservative 

4i 


member  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  the  significance  of  this 
coal  basin  is  made  clear  in  these  words: 

"  Indeed,  our  coal  mines  in  that  part  of  Pas-de-Calais 
which  was  not  invaded  and  which  remained  unhurt,  pro- 
duced 28,000  tons  of  coal  a  day,  indispensible  to  our  rail- 
ways and  war  industries,  particularly  during  the  active  sub- 
marine campaign.  The  Germans  on  their  side  could  ask 
their  government :  '  Why  were  not  Bruay  and  the  coal 
mines  bombarded  and  destroyed?  Why,  instead  of  attempt- 
ing an  unfruitful  effort  against  Verdun  in  February,  19 16, 
didn't  you  make  the  same  effort  toward  the  coal  basin  of 
Pas-de-Calais  ? '  They  surely  could  have  pierced  our  lines, 
since  at  that  time  the  second  and  third  trenches  had  not  been 
dug. 

"  It  can  be  said  today  that  the  truly  remarkable  activity 
of  our  coal  mines  of  Pas-de-Calais  and  the  willingness  of  our 
miners  working  day  and  night,  in  proximity  to  the  enemy 
lines  during  the  most  critical  hours  of  the  war,  have  con- 
tributed to  save  France  from  defeat. 

"  One  can  conclude  that  if  our  military  chiefs  and  men  in 
power  have  committed  a  few  errors  in  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  our  enemies  have  committed  much  greater  ones  and 
that  their  having  respected  to  the  very  end  of  the  war  the 
uninvaded  section  of  the  coal  mining  district  of  Pas-de-Calais 
was  not  the  least  among  these  errors."     [Italics  in  original.] 

This  same  point  was  brought  out  by  Francois  de  Wendel, 
head  of  the  Committee  of  Forges,  during  the  debates  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  on  February  1,  19 19,  when  he  said: 
"  If  it  was  so  easy  by  bombarding  the  mines  of  Briey  to  obtain 
the  results  that  we  hoped  for,  one  can  not  conceive  why  the 
Germans,  who  knew  our  coal  situation  and  realized  in  what 
difficulties  we  would  have  been  thrown  by  the  destruction  of 
the  mines  of  Pas-de-Calais,  did  not  destroy  them.  For  these 
mines  of  Pas-de-Calais  were  not  25  or  30  kilometers  [15 
to  20  miles]  from  the  front  as  were  those  of  Briey,  but  sim- 
ply 15  or  17  kilometers." 

This  remark  made  by  the  president  of  the  steel  combine 

42 


drew  from  Gustave  Tery  in  L'GLuvre,  February  7,  1919* 
the  following  comment :  "  It  is,  indeed,  inconceivable. 
What!  The  Boches  who  bombarded  Paris  120  kilometers 
distant  could  not  reach  French  Bruay  which  was  only  15 
kilometers  from  their  lines?  At  the  moment  that  I  asked 
myself  that  question  —  and  it  was  not  the  first  time  that  it 
had  come  to  me  —  I  heard  behind  me  a  colleague  ejaculate, 
*  By  George !  They  were  in  cahoots ! '  And  it  made  me 
shiver." 

Shortly  afterwards,  Le  Matin,  a  conservative  French  daily 
with  a  circulation  said  to  be  over  a  million  and  a  half  a 
day,  printed  on  its  front  page,  February  14,  19 19,  a  two  col- 
umn headline  which  read: 

WHY  WAS  NOT  BRIEY  BOMBARDED? 

Le  Matin  adds  today  to  the  debate  the  point 
of  view  of  the  French  high  command. 

Up  to  this  time  Le  Matin  had  been  "  playing  down " 
the  debate  over  Briey.  But  under  this  headline  it  published 
a  long  letter,  filling  nearly  a  column  and  a  half  on  the 
front  page,  signed  "  General  X,"  which  throws  illuminating 
light  on  the  working  of  the  military  mind.  Here  it  is,  in 
part: 

"  Why  was  not  an  attempt  made  to  destroy  the  smelters 
of  Briey,  or  at  least  prevent  all  work  in  them  by  bombard- 
ing them  continually?  Here  again  we  must  look  at  the 
question  in  its  true  setting.  Despite  all  that  may  be  said, 
war  is  a  matter  of  convention.  For  centuries  it  has  been  a 
magnificent  and  terrible  game  between  professionals.  One 
fought  according  to  the  rules  of  the  game. 

"  In  this  war  for  the  first  time  conventions,  because  it  was 
a  war  of  nations,  have  been  trodden  under  foot.  .  .  .  But 
some  tacit  convention  existed  nevertheless.  In  some  sectors 
men  could  at  certain  hours  attend  to  their  private  needs,  wash 
themselves  and  go  look  for  water  without  hearing  a  gun 
shot.  .  .  . 

43 


"  In  the  same  way,  the  bombardment  of  the  staff  head- 
quarters, when  they  were  not  on  an  important  route  or  at 
a  railhead  where  troops  were  concentrated,  was  most  often 
abstained  from" 

THE   COURTEOUS   GERMANS 

"When  Compiegne,  after  the  21st  of  March  (1918),  re- 
ceived every  night  visits  from  the  enemy  gothas,  the  palace 
where  the  Grand  General  Staff  was  installed,  did  not  re- 
ceive a  bomb.  The  Germans  bombarded  the  station,  the 
bridges  over  the  Oise,  the  crossroads, —  they  visibly  spared 
the  staff  Headquarters. 

"  It  should  be  noted  that  there  is  in  these  tacit  conventions 
a  point  of  view  of  general  interest  which  well  shows  how  in 
the  most  unreasonable  enterprises,  wisdom  makes  its  voice 
heard. 

"  Now,  there  was  much  of  this  wisdom  in  the  question 
of  Briey.  The  Germans  were  exploiting  the  smelters  in 
range  of  our  aviation,  but  we  were  exploiting  others  fully 
as  important  in  range  of  their  artillery.  As  far  as  possible 
the  security  of  the  one  bought  the  security  of  the  others. 
And  as  everything  is  relative,  there  were  not,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  many  bombs  dropped  on  one  side  or  the  other.  There 
may  have  been  a  general  order  forbidding  the  bombing  of  the 
Briey  smelters.  But  this  order  ought  to  be  interpreted  in 
this  manner:     '  Let  them  alone  and  let  them  leave  us  alone.' 

"  Do  you  wish  another  example  of  this  conventional  state 
of  spirit  which  will  reign  in  war  as  long  as  it  is  carried  on 
by  soldiers  of  career?  The  armistice  will  furnish  it.  It  is 
now  asked,  '  Why  was  not  the  immediate  demobilization  of 
the  German  army  demanded,  since  it  was  demanded  of  the 
Austrian  army?'  Simply  because,  following  the  time  hon- 
ored rule  of  military  dignity,  any  adversary  who  has  proved 
his  bravery  and  tenacity,  has  the  right  to  what  are  called  '  the 
honors  of  war,'  —  that  is  to  say,  to  retire  with  his  arms  and 
baggages.  Marshal  Foch  judged  that  the  German  army  had 
merited   this  concession,  while  the  Austrians,   bad  soldiers 

44 


that  they  were,  had  not  merited  it.  And  I  tell  you  that  not 
a  military  man  has  found  Marshal  Foch's  decision  wrong." 

Three  days  later  in  another  letter  to  Le  Matin,  replying 
to  Major  de  Grandmaison,  M  General  X  "  spoke  even  more 
plainly  of  the  "  tacit  agreement "  between  the  belligerents 
for  the  mutual  protection  of  staff  headquarters,  saying: 

"  We  have  even  seen  that  the  Grand  General  Staff  after 
the  2 ist  of  March,  when  the  enemy  suddenly  came  within 
20  kilometers  of  it,  was  at  Compiegne,  through  which  troops 
and  artillery  were  continually  passing.  And  so  the  Ger- 
mans, who  had  never  bombarded  Chantilly  nor  Beauvais  and 
who  later  did  not  bombard  Provins,  multiplied  at  this  time 
their  bombing  expeditions  to  Compiegne.  But  as  the  pal- 
ace —  the  headquarters  of  the  general  staff  —  was  by  its 
size  extremely  visible  and  sufficiently  distant  from  the  road, 
the  bridges  of  the  Oise  and  the  railway  station,  it  did  not 
receive  any  projectiles"     [Italics  mine.] 

The  explanation  of  this  immunity,  according  to  "  General 
X,"  was  that  from  the  military  point  of  view,  the  results 
obtainable  from  bombing  staff  headquarters  were  illusory 
and  not  worth  while. 

"a  gentlemen's  agreement?" 

It  was  the  publication  of  the  first  of  these  two  remarkable 
letters  .that  caused  Pierre  Renaudel,  Socialist  deputy,  to  de- 
clare during  the  debate  in  the  Chamber  that  day: 

"  It  is  only  for  the  poor  devils  that  war  is  not  a  gentle- 
men's agreement.  Or,  to  put  it  more  exactly,  the  only  agree- 
ment which  they  make  is  a  convention  with  death." 

"  Was  it  then  a  '  gentlemen's  agreement,'  similar  to  the 
one  -that  protected  staff  headquarters,  which  was  the  cause 
of  the  remarkable  immunity  which  the  coal  and  iron  mining 
districts  on  both  sides  of  the  western  front  enjoyed  during 
most  of  the  war?  The  letter  in  U  Information,  already 
quoted,  brings  out  this  point  succinctly.  After  referring  to 
the  complaints  of  French  aviation  officers  that  they  had  been 
forbidden  to  bomb  Briey,  the  writer  says: 

45 


"  The  motive  of  this  prohibition  of  which  the  aviation  of- 
ficers speak  seems,  according  to  rumors,  to  have  been  due 
to  a  tacit  agreement  between  the  belligerents.  It  would 
seem  that  we  said  to  the  Germans :  '  We  will  not  bombard 
Briey  from  which  you  get  your  iron  ore  if  you  will  respect, 
on  your  side,  Bruay  and  the  coal  basin  of  Pas-de-Calais.'  " 
[Italics  in  original.] 

Who,  at  bottom,  was  responsible  for  the  undeniable  im- 
munity accorded  these  iron  and  coal  mines? 

The  international  financial  and  mining  interests,  responds 
Deputy  Barthe,  who,  from  the  tribune  of  the  Chamber  on 
January  24,  19 19,  solemnly  declared: 

"  I  affirm  that  either  by  the  fact  of  the  international  soli- 
darity of  the  great  metallurgy  companies,  or  in  order  to 
safeguard  private  business  interests  our  military  chiefs  were 
ordered  not  to  bombard  the  establishments  of  the  Briey 
basin  which  were  being  exploited  by  the  enemy  during  the 
war. 

"  I  affirm  that  our  aviation  service  received  instructions 
to  respect  the  blast  furnaces  in  which  the  enemy  steel  was 
being  made,  and  that  a  general  who  had  wished  to  bombard 
them  was  reprimanded." 

THE  FLAG  OF   BIG  BUSINESS 

Gaudin  de  Villaine,  a  Conservative  member  of  the  French 
Senate,  went  a  step  further  in  his  brochure,  "  Le  Fou  de  roi," 
(The  King's  Fool),  in  which  he  cites  page  18  of  the  French 
Yellow  Book: 

"  Fabricants  of  cannon  and  armor  plate,  great  merchants 
who  demand  the  greatest  markets ;  bankers  who  speculate  on 
the  age  of  gold  and  on  the  next  indemnity,  think  (in  Ger- 
many) that  the  war  should  be  good  business." 

Then  he  declares  that  the  true  profiteers  of  the  war  are 
"  the  producers  of  the  metals  of  the  world  brigaded  under 
the  banner  of  the  Metallgesellschaft  of  Frankfort."  He  con- 
cludes : 

"  I  formally  accuse  the  big  cosmopolitan  banks,  at  least 

46  v 


47 


the  owners  of  mining  rights,  of  having  conceived,  prepared 
and  let  loose  this  horrible  tragedy  with  the  monstrous  thought 
of  world  stock- jobbing.  I  accuse  these  same  money  powers 
of  having,  before  and  since  the  war,  betrayed  the  interests  of 
France." 

But,  some  will  urge,  it  is  absurd  to  think  that  the  mineral 
magnates  of  France  or  Germany  should  have  brought  about 
a  "  tacit  agreement  "  to  protect  their  properties  during  the 
war.  Why,  everybody  knows  that  modern  wars  are  fought 
for  the  possession  of  coal  and  iron  deposits.  That's  what 
the  Franco-Prussian  war  was  over.  It  may  be  granted  that 
in  1 87 1  and  for  a  country  industrially  "on  the  make,"  as 
Germany  was,  such  a  motive  may  exist.  And  it  would 
seem  that  the  same  motive  would  hold  good  for  the  French 
capitalists.  Yet,  as  has  been  shown  in  this  article,  the  flag 
which  flies  over  a  mining  district  matters  but  little  to  capital 
for  the  ownership  of  the  mines  is  international.  The  Ger- 
man empire  took  possession  of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  1871,  but 
we  have  seen  that  French  capitalists  still  retained  their 
property  rights  in  the  Lorraine  basin. 

However  obvious  may  seem  the  value  to  France  of  pos- 
session of  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  plain  fact  is  that  to  the  French 
steel  trust  —  the  Committee  of  Forges  —  the  return  of  these 
two  provinces  was  not  regarded  as  an  unmitigated  blessing. 
In  a  deposition  made  October  28,  191 5,  before  a  committee 
of  the  French  Senate,  Robert  Pinot,  general  secretary  of  the 
Committee  of  Forges  —  and  a  number  of  other  big  metallur- 
gical combines  —  stated: 

"The  return  of  France  to  the  frontiers  of  19 15  (that  is, 
the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine)  would  place  the  French 
metallurgical  industry  in  an  excessively  critical  situation, 
and,  in  addition,  would  aggravate  very  seriously  the  depend- 
ance  of  France  on  foreign  countries  for  supplies  of  coal  and 
coke." 


48 


PITY  THE  POOR  STEEL  TRUST 

According  to  his  figures,  the  addition  of  the  Lorraine  iron 
basin  to  France  would  force  the  country  to  import  28,000,- 
000  tons  of  coal  each  year.  But  there  was  the  German  coal 
basin  of  the  Sarre,  which  was  included  in  France  in  the 
boundaries  of  1814,  and  Mr.  Pinot  then  discussed  the  ef- 
fect of  France  annexing  the  Sarre  district.  He  said  it  would 
reduce  the  coal  importations  8,000,000  tons  a  year,  but  his 
conclusion  was: 

11  But  it  must  be  remarked  that  if  the  general  interest  im- 
periously commands  the  re-annexation  of  the  Sarre  coal 
basin,  the  particular  situation  of  the  French  metallurgical 
industry  will  by  this  fact  be  made  even  more  serious." 

Why?  The  reason  that  Mr.  Pinot  gave  was  that  the 
return  to  France  of  the  Lorraine  iron  district  would  in- 
crease enormously  the  iron  and  steel  production  of  France, 
and,  as  there  were  some  smelters  in  the  Sarre  basin,  the  an- 
nexation of  it  would  further  increase  this  production.  But 
why  should  the  French  mineral  trust  oppose  this  increase  in 
production?  Remember  that  the  policy  of  the  Committee 
of  Forges  was  one  of  economic  malthusianism  —  keep  pro- 
duction down  so  as  to  keep  prices  up.  Sheltered  behind  a 
tariff  which  has  been  described  as  "  prohibitive,"  the  com- 
bine was  able  to  keep  domestic  prices  up  as  high  as  it 
pleased. 

No  one  has  better  described  the  policy  of  the  Committee 
of  Forges  than  Abbe  Wetterle,  the  deputy  from  Alsace  in 
the  French  Chamber,  who  declared : 

"  I  had  understood  nothing  in  those  days  of  the  mental 
reservations  of  those  who  wished  to  deprive  us  of  the  fruit 
of  our  long  and  sorrowful  wait.  I  saw  their  game  more 
clearly,  when,  a  few  months  later,  their  opposition  crystal- 
lized in  more  precise  formulas.  We  find  before  us  these 
partisans  of  economic  malthusianism,  who,  disdainful  of  the 
national  wealth,  preoccupy  themselves  uniquely  with  rarify- 
fying  a  product  on  the  domestic  market  in  order  to  sell  it 

49 


more  dearly.  They  are  the  representatives  of  the  least  ef- 
fort who  are  afraid  of  a  crisis  of  over-production,  persons, 
either  timorous  or  more  often  selfish  to  the  point  of  forget- 
ting patriotic  duty,  who  consent  to  leave  to  Germany  all  of 
her  formidable  advance,  provided  that  they  themselves, 
sheltered  behind  a  solid  tariff  wall  on  the  frontier,  can  sell 
at  higher  prices  their  decreasing  production." 

Since  it  realized  that  even  it  could  not  come  out  openly 
against  the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  the  Com- 
mittee of  Forges  hit  upon  a  happy  compromise  policy  and 
called  for  the  erection  of  a  tariff  frontier  between  the  re- 
turned provinces  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  rest  of  France. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  this  boon  will  be  granted  them, 
but  they  have  made  a  good  start  in  that  direction.  They  are 
still  following  their  old  policy  of  filling  the  strategical  posi- 
tions with  their  own  henchmen.  Little  notice  was  taken  in 
this  country  of  the  announcement  of  February  21,  19 19,  that 
Mr.  Millerand  had  been  appointed  governor-general  of 
Alsace-Lorraine.  But  in  France  it  is  known  that  Millerand 
is  the  attorney  of  the  steel  combine  —  the  Committee  of 
Forges. 

BLOODY  PROFITS 

It  will  be  seen  from  this  exposure  of  the  policy  of  the 
Committee  of  Forges  toward  the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
if  it  has  not  already  been  sufficiently  demonstrated  in  this 
article,  that  the  interests  of  a  nation  and  the  interests  of 
private  property  are  two  separate  and  distinct  things. 
Whether  the  money  and  mineral  international  did  or  did 
not  prepare  and  start  the  war,  as  Senator  de  Villaine  charges, 
it  is  certain  that  the  51  months  during  which  millions  of 
men  were  killed  was  a  most  profitable  era  for  these  interests. 
The  wholesale  slaughter  of  men,  it  cannot  be  denied,  means 
good  business  to  those  who  furnish  the  instruments  of 
death. 

When  war  does  not  exist,  these  interests  seek  to  cause 
it.     That  was  shown  by  Liebknecht  in  19 13  when  he  ex- 

50 


posed  before  the  German  Reichstag  the  policy  of  the  Krupps, 
which  was  to  subsidize  French  newspapers  at  Paris  to  at- 
tack Germany  and  then  use  these  editorial  attacks  to  con- 
vince the  Reichstag  that  Germany  for  fear  of  France  must 
increase  her  armament. 

STOCK  AND   BOND   MORALITY 

And  when  war  does  exist,  we  have  seen  what  happens. 
The  "  Red  "  International  Socialists  may  be  forbidden  to 
attend  a  Stockholm  conference  for  the  purpose  of  discussing 
peace  terms.  But  the  "  Yellow  "  International  of  the  finan- 
cial and  mineral  interests  is  not  disturbed  in  its  working  dur- 
ing even  the  time  of  war.  Here  is  one  last  bit  of  evidence  of 
that  fact.  When  the  Socialists  were  being  denounced  be- 
cause of  the  proposed  Stockholm  conference,  this  little 
news  dispatch  was  sent  from  Switzerland  by  the  Havas 
Agency  and  appeared  on  October  29,  19 17,  in  the  columns 
of  Le  Temps,  the  Paris  organ  of  the  French  moneyed 
interests : 

"  An  examination  of  the  rumors  concerning  the  negotia- 
tions for  peace,  which  are  said  to  have  taken  place  among 
the  members  of  high  finance  from  the  two  groups  of  powers 
has  shown  that  the  story  arose  simply  from  the  meetings 
between  financiers  of  the  Entente  and  of  the  Central  Powers 
for  the  purpose  of  exchanging  certain  stocks  and  bonds." 

Based  on  the  facts  which  have  been  given  in  this  article, 
it  is  submitted  that  for  those  who  own  the  mines  and  smelt- 
ers, and  who,  despite  the  fact  that  their  properties  are  situ- 
ated in  close  proximity  to  the  front,  are  permitted  to  exploit 
them  and  reap  the  profits  from  them,  war  is  not  the  fearful 
calamity  it  is  to  the  common  men  on  the  famous  plains  of 
Picardy  and  the  fields  of  Flanders  who  by  the  million  are 
slaughtered  by  the  output  of  these  mutually  protected  mines. 

War,  Sherman  said,  is  hell. 

But  business,  as  Octave  Mirbeau  remarked,  is  business. 

What,  then  is  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  these  facts  ? 

5i 


I  can  do  no  better  than  reproduce  the  one  expressed  by  Gus- 
tave  Tery,  February  7,  19 19,  in  UCEuvre: 

"  No  one  can  deny  any  longer  the  existence  of  the  Metal- 
lurgical International.  It  is  for  the  nations  now  to  see  and 
comprehend  this  fact.  Consider  an  iron  mine.  Is  it  too 
much  to  say  that  those  who  own  it  control  peace  and  war? 
What,  in  reality,  is  the  most  profitable  way  of  handling  iron 
ore?  It  is  in  manufacturing  it  into  armament.  It  is  to  the 
interest  of  the  maker  of  arms  and  munitions  to  increase  arma- 
ment, the  excess  of  which  inevitably  provokes  armed  con- 
flicts. Modern  war  is  the  natural  and  ever-recurring  fruit 
of  metallurgy. 

"If  this  one  truth  is  known  today,  20,000,000  men  will 
not  have  died  in  vain.  But  it  must  be  inscribed  in  the  minds 
and  hearts  of  all  the  survivors.  They  must  thoroughly  un- 
derstand the  simple  relation  of  this  simple  effect  to  this  sim- 
ple cause:  Remove  the  sabre  from  whatever  kaiser  threatens 
to  overrun  the  world;  he  will  remain  peaceful  or  become  a 
laughing  stock.  .  .  .  Separate  man  from  iron  and  coal  and 
he  is  powerless  and  war  is  impossible. 

"  The  first  article  of  the  covenant  of  a  true  Society  of 
Nations  ought  not  to  be  a  naive  appeal  to  fraternity  nor  a 
declaration  of  '  immortal  principles,'  but  simply  this :  Coal 
and  iron  can  no  longer  in  any  country  remain  private 
property." 


52 


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The  most  intelligent  and  informative  book  on  Russia  that  has  thus 
far  been  written.  The  author  is  an  expert  on  Russia  and  is  one  of 
England's  best  writers  and  most  faithful  reporters.  The  actual 
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there  are  interviews  with  Lenin  and  all  the  leaders,  including  the 
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necessary  a  second  printing  before   publication. 

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tions of  democracy.  Such  information  and  much  more,  essential  to 
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expression.  It  crystallizes  the  wide-spread  dissatisfaction  fermenting 
in  the  minds  of  workers.  "The  commodity  theory  of  Labour,"  says 
the  author,  "is  fundamentally  inconsistent  with  the  recognition  of 
the  fact  that  'Labour'  consists  of  human  beings."  He  denies  the 
sovereignty  of  the  state  but  regards  it  as  only  one  among  various 
forms  of  association.  The  book  reveals  the  difference  between  the 
commonwealth  that  is  and  the  one  that  might  be.  Mr.  Cole  is  a 
leading  writer  in  the  Guild  Socialist  movement  and  this  book,  in  the 
Manchester  Guardian's  opinion,  is  his  best  since  "The  World  of 
Labour." 

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among  the  younger  publicists  of  his  day,  and  a  fragment  from  an 
unfinished  work  on  the  State.  A  fresh  scrutiny  of  this  profound, 
brilliantly  presented  material  confirms  the  widely  held  opinion  that 
our  country  lost  one  of  its  most  significant  thinkers  by  his  death. 
The  volume  includes  the  famous  "The  War  and  the  Intellectuals" 
and  other  papers  that  contributed  to  the  brief  but  enviable  career 
of  The  Seven  Arts  whose  editor,  James  Oppcnheim,  writes  a  fore- 
word. 

Waldo  R.  Browne  (editor) :    Man  or  the  State?  ($1.00). 

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on  the  problems  of  the  State  and  on  the  individual's  relation  to  it. 
Such  books  as  those  by  Laski,  Zimmern,  Follett  and  Burns  attest  the 
interest  of  contemporary  scholars;  this  volume  shows  the  importance 
to  our  day  of  their  forerunners  of  the  19th  century.  It  includes 
essays  by  Kropotkin,  Buckle,  Emerson,  Thoreau,  Spencer,  Tolstoy 
and  Wilde,  that  will  live  long  and,  as  some  of  them  are  not  easily 
accessible,  the  book  will  be  doubly  prized.  An  introduction  by  Mr. 
Browne  integrates  the  contents  and  relates  the  best  thought  of  the 
last  century  to  the  paramount  political   questions  of  our   time. 

By  Leon  Duguit:    Law  in  the  Modern  State  ($2.50). 

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French  political  thinkers  and  the  book  here  translated  is  generally 
regarded  as  his  best  and  most  suggestive  work.  The  decline  of  the 
omnipotent  state  has  forced  into  review  the  problems  of  representative 
government.  M.  Duguit  discusses  in  this  book  the  mechanisms  by 
which  the  state  may  be  made  effectively  responsible  to  its  citizens. 
An  introduction  by  Harold  J.  Laski  traces  the  relation  of  his  ideas 
to  those  of  American  and  British  thinkers.  The  book  is  not  only  a 
guide  to  the  most  vital  of  modern  political  problems  but  an  analysis 
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tion is  by  Frida  and  Harold  Laski. 

By  H.  N.  Brailsford:     The  Covenant  of  Peace  (Paper  covers, 
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Brailsford  whose  books  and  articles  on  the  subject  are  well  known. 
Here  he  presents  the  entire  subject  in  an  essay  that  received  a  prize 
.  of  £100  awarded  by  a  jury  that  included  H.  G.  Wells,  John  Gals- 
worthy and  Professor  Bury.  The  pamphlet  is  valuable  to  those  who 
think  they  know  all  about  the  subject  as  well  as  to  those  who  know 
that  they  know  nothing  about  it.  An  introduction  by  Herbert  Croly 
assists  in  posing  the  problem  for  the  reader. 

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